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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The front caption contains all parties to the appeal; however, Pulmonetic Systems,
Inc., a Delaware Corporation, which manufactured the ventilator at issue, was also named
as a defendant and was a party to the proceedings before the trial court prior to the first
appeal. Pulmonetic settled with Mr. Nguyen, and it is no longer a party to this case. In
addition, the University of Utah is not a party to this appeal. The remaining claim against
the University of Utah regarding informed consent is pending before the trial court.
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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78A-4-102(2)G).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err in granting PCMC's motion for summary judgment and
concluding that PCMC did not have an independent duty of care to obtain informed
consent regarding Derek Nguyen's course of treatment?
Standard of Review: On appeal from a summary judgment motion, the appellate court
reviews the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Whether a party is entitled
to summary judgment presents a question of law and the appellate court grants no
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness. See
Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, 948 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS,
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-406 - attached in Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter started as a products liability action and medical malpractice action
arising from a serious motor vehicle accident. In the first appeal, the primary issue was
whether the trial court erred in excluding Mr. Nguyen's standard-of-care expert, Dr.
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Goldenring. See Nguyen v. IHC Health Services, Inc., 2010 UT App 85, 232 P.3d 529.
In addition, Mr. Nguyen appealed the dismissal of his causes of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, punitive damages, negligence, and failure to obtain
informed consent.

This Court affirmed the exclusion of Dr. Goldenring and the

dismissal of Mr. Nguyen's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, punitive
damages, and negligence. This Court reversed the dismissal of the informed consent
claim because the trial court's sole rationale for granting summary judgment was the
absence of expert testimony, and this Court held that expert testimony was not required to
establish Mr. Nguyen's informed consent claim. This Court remanded Mr. Nguyen's
informed consent claim for trial or such other disposition as the trial court deemed
proper.
After this Court's remand, the trial court granted Primary Children's Medical
Center's motion for summary judgment, holding that Primary Children's Medical Center
did not have a duty to obtain informed consent for treatment ordered by Dr. Madolin
Witte, Derek Nguyen's attending physician. The sole issue in this interlocutory appeal is
whether a hospital has an independent duty to obtain informed consent that is separate
from the attending physician's duty to obtain informed consent for care and treatment she
orders. The issue of whether Dr. Witte properly obtained informed consent remains
pending before the district court.

2
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Facts
On November 24, 2001, Derek Nguyen was transported to PCMC via helicopter
and admitted to the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit with multiple life-threatening injuries,
including a degloving scalp laceration, facial lacerations, fractured skull, a brain injury,
contusions to both lungs, and lacerations to intra-abdominal organs. (R. at 807-807, 3400
at p. 4.) Dr. Madolin Witte was Derek's attending physician in the PICU.
Although Dr. Witte was Derek's attending physician at PCMC, Dr. Witte is an
employee of the University of Utah School of Medicine, and she wears a name tag
identifying herself as a University employee. Dr. Witte has held faculty appointments in
the Division of Pediatric Critical Care and Division of Pediatric Pulmonary Medicine at
the University for the past 20 years. Dr. Witte's clinical practice is limited to providing
inpatient critical care and pulmonary care to pediatric patients at PCMC. (R. at 785, 793.)
After graduating from medical school, Dr. Witte completed residency training in
pediatrics, followed by fellowship training in pediatric pulmonary medicine and pediatric
critical care medicine. Dr. Witte is board certified in pediatrics. She also holds
subspecialty board certifications in both pediatric critical care medicine and pediatric
pulmonology. (R. at 786, 788.)
During Derek's three-day hospitalization, Dr. Witte obtained consultations from
other health care providers regarding various aspects of Derek's medical condition
including: trauma surgery, neurosurgery, orthopedic surgery, ophthalmology, cardiology,
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and plastic surgery. Dr. Witte also received input about Derek's condition from a PICU
fellow, PICU residents, respiratory therapists, and PICU nurses. (R. at 793, 3400 at p. 6.)
Although Dr. Witte obtained input from many health care providers, she retained ultimate
responsibility for making decisions about Derek's treatment and care. (R. at 793.)
Derek faced several medical problems, but the two most critical medical issues
were his brain injury and the injuries to his lungs. The brain injury caused swelling and
elevated intracranial pressures ("ICPs"). Elevated ICPs can cause inadequate blood
supply to the brain, resulting in permanent neurologic injury or death. Derek's health
care providers were closely monitoring his ICPs and the adequacy of blood perfusion to
Derek's brain, which is measured in units of cerebral perfusion pressure ("CPPs"). (R. at
791,794,806,845.)
Despite aggressive treatment of Derek's brain injury, Derek's condition
deteriorated. By November 26, Derek's ICPs were in the mid to high twenties. In
contrast, a normal ICP is under fifteen. In addition, Derek's CPPs were in the forties,
whereas even a patient with a brain injury should have a CPP of sixty. In Dr. Witte's
clinical judgment, Derek's ICPs and CPPs were not conducive to a good neurologic
outcome. (R. at 795, 808-809.)
Similarly, despite aggressive treatment, Derek's lung injury and respiratory
condition deteriorated. As a result of his respiratory failure, Derek was intubated and
placed on a ventilator. By November 26, Derek's bedside ventilator had to be set at a

4
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very high pressure to adequately inflate his lungs. Specifically, a pressure of 60 was
required to inflate Derek's lungs, whereas a normal inflation pressure would be in the
teens. Despite this extreme pressure setting, Derek's oxygen saturation levels were not
adequate. (R. at 804, 806-807, 809.)
By November 26, Dr. Witte was concerned that the treatment for Derek's brain
injury was compounding his lung injury and that treatment for his lung injury was
negatively affecting his brain injury. Specifically, Dr. Witte was concerned that
measures taken to increase Derek's CPP were causing or contributing to poor heart
function. In fact, Dr. Witte was concerned that Derek could go into cardiopulmonary
arrest within hours. Dr. Witte was also concerned that Derek's poor heart function and
the treatment of his lung injuries with high pressure ventilation were causing elevated
ICPs. (R. at 791, 795, 804, 806, 809.)
Dr. Witte's assessment of Derek's deteriorating cardiopulmonary and brain
conditions led her to question whether a different course of treatment should be pursued.
In particular, Dr. Witte questioned whether an intracranial bleed or a blood clot in
Derek's brain was causing his ICPs and CPPs to worsen. If true, surgery was an option
to treat the bleeding or clotting. If, however, bleeding or clotting was not present and the
swelling of Derek's brain was not severe, Dr. Witte planned to shift gears and focus on
maximizing treatment of Derek's lung and heart injuries by placing him on a different
type of ventilator that could generate very high pressures. (R. at 795-796, 807.)
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By the afternoon of November 26, Dr. Witte believed that obtaining a CT scan of
the brain was "very critical" to assess possible causes for Derek's worsening ICPs and
CPPs and to evaluate whether a different type of ventilator should be used. In Dr. Witte's
professional judgment, a CT scan was a prerequisite to any new course of treatment. (R.
at 791, 795, 807-809.) In order to do a CT scan, Derek had to be transported from the
PICU to the radiology department. Although Dr. Witte knew that transporting Derek
involved risk, she concluded that the risk of delaying a CT scan exceeded the risk of the
transport. In fact, Dr. Witte believed there was a high likelihood that Derek would die if
a CT scan was not performed in the afternoon of November 26, 2001. Dr. Witte's
conclusion about the necessity of obtaining a CT scan was based on the severity and
instability of Derek's condition. (R. at 796, 802-804.)
In order to transport Derek from the PICU to the CT scanner in the radiology
department, Dr. Witte needed to use a portable ventilator to maintain Derek's pulmonary
function. After receiving input from other health care providers, including the PICU
fellow, PICU residents, respiratory therapists, and PICU nurses, Dr. Witte decided to use
a ventilator manufactured by Pulmonetic because it was the only available transport
ventilator that could provide the level and mode of ventilation support Derek required.
(R. at 789, 791, 793-794, 799, 812.) The Pulmonetic ventilator is approved by the FDA
for use on pediatric patients in intensive care units and for use in transporting pediatric
patients. Further, the ventilator is used at other pediatric hospitals across the country to

6
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transport critically ill patients. (R. at 805, 1882-1883, 1898.) When asked what she
would have done if the Pulmonetic ventilator had not been available, Dr. Witte testified:
Well, it's hard to say not knowing what his course would
have been, but I would have been reluctant to try to transport
him on a different ventilator because in our experience it
didn't support patients with this severity of lung disease very
reliably, and so I think it was possible that had he continued
to worsen our hand might have been forced and we would
have tried to do that anyway. I think at that particular
moment in time had that ventilator not been available I would
not have taken him for CT scan. (R. at 790).
Before Derek was transported to the CT scanner, his father was advised that (1)
Dr. Witte thought it was important to obtain a CT scan; (2) Derek would have to be
transported for the CT scan; and (3) there was risk involved in transporting Derek out of
the PICU. Dr. Witte discussed the risks and benefits of transporting Derek out of the
PICU, and, Derek's father responded by saying, "Do what you can to save my son." (R.
at 1889, 1907.) Prior to being transported to the CT scanner, Derek was placed on the
Pulmonetic ventilator in the PICU and monitored for approximately an hour. During that
time, it was confirmed that the ventilator was duplicating the level of support provided by
Derek's bedside ventilator. (R. at 790, 808, 813-814.)
Dr. Witte had no concerns about the Pulmonetic ventilator's performance, but she
acknowledged that transporting a patient outside of the PICU always presents a risk to the
patient's ventilation status. Dr. Witte further acknowledged that all ventilators
malfunction periodically for various reasons. For that reason, transports are always made
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with emergency equipment so that the patient can be manually ventilated, if necessary.
(R. at 796, 1255, 1890, 1892.) After the CT scan was completed and while Derek was
being transported back to the PICU, the Pulmonetic ventilator suddenly lost power. A
respiratory therapist involved in the transport immediately began manually ventilating
Derek with a bag and mask, but Derek did not respond. Upon arrival at the PICU, Derek
was placed on a high-pressure bedside ventilator. Efforts to resuscitate Derek over 45
minutes were not successful. (R. at 797, 815-817, 821.)
A subsequent investigation conducted by Pulmonetic concluded that the ventilator
most likely lost power as a result of a screw making contact with the ventilator's
motherboard and causing it to short circuit. The investigation did not reveal any misuse
of the ventilator, and the lead investigator testified that the health care providers could
not have known about the screw problem. (R. at 824-827.) Dr. Witte testified that if she
had the decision to make all over again, she would still order the use of the Pulmonetic
ventilator. (R. at 793.)
Procedural History and Disposition Below
This interlocutory appeal is the second time this matter has come to this Court for
review. In the first appeal, Mr. Nguyen appealed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to both defendants. The trial court excluded Mr. Nguyen's standard of care
expert, Dr. Goldenring, dismissed certain causes of action based on the lack of expert
testimony to establish the requisite elements, and dismissed other causes of action on the

8
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merits. Nguyen v. IHC Health Services, Inc., 2010 UT App 85, 232 P.3d 529 (dismissing
intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages claims on the merits,
affirming exclusion of plaintiff s expert witness, and affirming grant of summary
judgment on negligence claim for lack of expert testimony to establish a breach of the
standard of care). In the first appeal, this Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of Mr.
Nguyen's informed consent claim because this Court determined that expert testimony
was not required to prove this claim. See id. Because the trial court's sole rationale for
granting summary judgment on the informed consent claim was the absence of expert
testimony, this Court remanded to the trial court "for trial or other such disposition as
may now be proper." Id. at ^[ 18.
On remand from this Court's first decision, PCMC moved for summary judgment
on Mr. Nguyen's claim for failure to obtain informed consent. As a hospital, PCMC
argued that it did not have an independent duty to obtain informed consent. Moreover,
PCMC cited to multiple decisions establishing that hospitals generally do not have a duty
to obtain informed consent and that requiring a hospital to obtain informed consent would
interfere with the physician-patient relationship. The trial court granted PCMC's motion
for summary judgment. The trial court set a trial date for Mr. Nguyen's remaining claim
for lack of informed consent against the University of Utah, and its employee, Dr.
Madolin Witte; however, the trial court stayed the action in order to allow Mr. Nguyen to
pursue this interlocutory appeal. (R. at 5853-54.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The underlying facts of this case paint a stark picture of the multiple medical
issues Derek faced when he arrived at PCMC. Indeed, Derek had several life-threatening
injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Derek's attending physician was Dr.
Madolin Witte. Dr. Witte is not an employee of PCMC or Intermountain Health Care.
Instead, Dr. Witte is an employee of the University of Utah School of Medicine, where
she has held faculty appointments in the Division of Pediatric Critical Care and Division
of Pediatric Pulmonary Medicine for over 20 years. (R. at 785, 793.) Dr. Witte is
uniquely qualified to provide inpatient critical care and pulmonary care to pediatric
patients at PCMC.
Notwithstanding Dr. Witte's qualifications and acceptance of responsibility for
Derek's care while he was at PCMC, Mr. Nguyen asks this Court to reverse the trial court
and find that hospitals owe patients a duty to obtain informed consent independent of and
in addition to the duty of the attending physician to obtain informed consent. In so doing,
Mr. Nguyen requests that this Court find concurrent duties to obtain informed consent
running to both the attending physician and to the hospital in which the care is provided.
This Court should decline Mr. Nguyen's invitation to require hospitals to obtain informed
consent because concurrent duties to obtain informed consent are unnecessarily
duplicative and potentially dangerous to the proper care and treatment of patients.

10
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ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court correctly determined that PCMC had no duty to obtain
informed consent from Mr. Nguyen as a matter of law.
PCMC does not have a duty to obtain informed consent for medical procedures

and treatment ordered by Dr. Witte. The requirements for informed consent are set forth
in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-406, which requires a patient to prove the following in order
to recover for failure to obtain informed consent:
(a)

that a provider-patient relationship existed between the patient and
health care provider;

(b)

the health care provider rendered health care to the patient;

(c)

the health care provider suffered personal injuries arising out of the
health care rendered;

(d)

the health care rendered carried with it a substantial and significant
risk of causing the patient serious harm;

(e)

the patient was not informed of the substantial and significant risk;

(f)

a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would not have
consented to the health care rendered after having been fully
informed as to all facts relevant to the decision to give consent; and

(g)

the unauthorized part of the health care rendered was the proximate
cause of personal injuries suffered by the patient.

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-406(l) (2008). Interpreting this statute, this Court has
summarized that "[i]nformed consent refers to the 'general principle' that a 'physician
has a duty to disclose . . . to his patient... whatever grave risks of injury might be
incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so that a patient. .. may intelligently
exercise his judgment' regarding whether to undergo the treatment." Lounsbury v. Capel,
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836 P.2d 188, 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added) (holding that informed consent
cause of action is distinct from a cause of action for battery).
Although Dr. Witte received input from many sources regarding Derek's treatment
and care, she was the person in charge of Derek's treatment. Dr. Witte possessed the
knowledge, medical history, and training to assess Derek's injuries and condition, to
receive and evaluate the input from the others, and to recommend a course of treatment.
Consequently, Dr. Witte was the provider who had the duty to discuss the risks and
benefits of the proposed course of treatment. Indeed, Dr. Witte has acknowledged this
duty and testified that she discussed with Mr. Nguyen the need to transport Derek to get a
CT scan in order to obtain more information to evaluate his condition. (R. at 1889) In
the context of this discussion, Mr. Nguyen testified that he authorized her to do whatever
was necessary to try to save Derek's life. (R. at 1907)
Mr. Nguyen's argument rests in large part on the statutory definition of "health
care provider." See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-403(12). PCMC concedes it meets the
statutory definition of a health care provider, but the analysis of whether a hospital has an
independent duty to obtain informed consent is far more extensive than meeting this
statutory definition. In Giese v. Stice, 567 N.W.2d 156 (Neb. 1997), the Nebraska
Supreme Court rejected Mr. Nguyen's argument, holding that "to impose a general duty
upon all entities meeting the statutory definition of 'health care provider' would result in
an unwarranted imposition on the physician-patient relationship and would be "Tar more
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disruptive than beneficial to a patient.'"" Id. at 164 (quoting Howell v. Spokane &
Inland Empire Blood Bank, 785 P.2d 815, 822 (Wash. App. 1990)). The Nebraska Court
stated: "We agree with the majority of jurisdictions which have considered this issue.
We hold that a hospital has no independent duty to obtain a patient's informed consent to
a surgical procedure to be performed by a physician who is not an employee of the
hospital and that such duty lies exclusively with the treating physician." Id. The trial
court in this case adopted the reasoning in Giese and the majority position of those
jurisdictions who have considered the issue of whether hospitals have an independent
duty to obtain informed consent. (R. at 5839.)

1 The majority position is that hospitals do not owe an independent or concurrent
duty to obtain informed consent. See Ward v. Lutheran Hospitals & Homes Society of
America, Inc., 963 P.2d 1031 (Alaska 1998) (holding that the duty to obtain informed
consent does not extend to hospitals and the fact that a hospital comes within the
definition of "health care provider" does not warrant a conclusion that every entity and
every individual that falls within the definition has equal informed consent obligations);
see also Purnell v. Cedars-Sinai Med Ctr., No. B188780, 2007 WL 2938438, at *9 (Cal.
Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2007) (holding that the duty to obtain informed consent rests only with
those physicians who have actively managed the patient's care, not the hospital); Krane
v. Saint Anthony Hosp. Sys., 738 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the
hospital does not have a duty to obtain informed consent similar to that which the
surgeon is obligated to obtain); Sherwood v. Danbury Hosp., 896 A.2d 777, 792 (Conn.
2006) (holding that the hospital does not have a duty to inform patients of the risks and
benefits associated with a procedure and to impose such a duty would require the hospital
to disruptively intervene in the physician/patient relationship); Auler v. Van Natta, 686
N.E.2d 172, 175 (Ind. App. 1997) (holding that a hospital has no independent duty to
obtain a patient's informed consent); Lincoln v. Gupta, 370 N.W.2d 312, 318 (Mich.
App. 1985) (stating that a physician, not the hospital, has a duty to warn a patient of the
consequences of a medical procedure); D.N.N, v. Berestka, No. A06-2266, 2008 WL
313898, at *2 (Minn. App. Feb. 5. 2008) (holding that "[i]t is the duty of the physician,
not the hospital, to ensure that a patient gives informed consent for a surgical
procedure"); Giese v. Stice, 567 N.W.2d 156 (Neb. 1997) (holding that a hospital does
13
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PCMC can act only through its employees and staff, but Mr. Nguyen does not
identify which PCMC employee was qualified to discuss Derek's condition and proposed
course of treatment. Derek had multiple life-threatening injuries. More importantly, the
treatment of one of his injuries was not necessarily compatible with the treatment for
another injury. In fact, Dr. Witte wanted a CT scan because she recognized the treatment
for Derek's life-threatening respiratory condition may have exacerbated his similarly lifethreatening intracranial pressures and perfusion. With a CT scan, Dr. Witte hoped to
eliminate one or more possible causes in order to refine Derek's course of treatment. In
Dr. Witte's opinion, the risk of leaving Derek in the PICU and not having the information
a CT scan could provide outweighed the risk of transporting Derek out of the PICU to get
not have an independent duty to obtain a patient's informed consent to a surgical
procedure to be performed by a non-employee physician); Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 832 P.2d 797, 799 (N.M. App. 1992) (holding that hospitals have no duty to obtain
informed consent for a procedure ordered by a non-employee physician and performed by
hospital employees); Barbato v. Livingston, No. 16986/04, 2008 WL 269627, at *7 (N.Y.
Sup. Jan. 23, 2008) (stating that it was the duty of the physician not the hospital to obtain
the patient's informed consent); Kershaw v. Reichert, 445 N.W.2d 16, 17 (N.D. 1989)
(holding that a hospital has no duty to obtain informed consent from the patient); Goss v.
Oklahoma Blood Inst, 856 P.2d 998, 1007 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (refusing to impose a
duty upon hospitals to obtain a patient's informed consent); Valles v. Albert Einstein
Med. Ctr., 758 A.2d 1238, 1243 (Pa. Super. 2000) (stating that "hospitals generally have
no duty to a patient under the informed consent doctrine"); Bryant v. McCord, No.
01A01-9801-CV-00046, 1999 WL 10085, at *7 (Tenn. App. Jan. 12, 1999) (holding that
"hospitals generally do not have a duty to obtain a patient's informed consent"); Ritter v.
Delaney, 790 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that it is not the hospital's
duty to secure informed consent from the patient); Adams v. Johnston, No. 17826-9-III,
2000 WL 464053, at *4 (Wash. App. April 13, 2000) (recognizing that the duty to obtain
informed consent is on the physician, not the hospital); Staudt v. Froedtert Mem 7
Lutheran Hosp., 580 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Wis. App. 1998) (holding that the duty to get
informed consent from a patient rests with the physician and not the hospital).
14
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aCTscan.
Nobody on PCMC's staff had the qualifications or knowledge to recommend a
course of treatment or to discuss the pros and cons of transporting Derek out of the PICU
to get a CT scan. The majority of jurisdictions addressing this issue have acknowledged
this very concern in rejecting the imposition of a duty on a hospital to obtain informed
consent. See Giese, 567 N.W.2d at 163-64 (discussing and citing to majority of
jurisdictions who have refused to impose a duty on hospitals to obtain informed consent).
As one Washington State appellate court succinctly stated: "Diagnosis is the
responsibility of the doctor." Adams v. Johnston, 100 Wash.App. 1025, 2000 WL
464053 (Wash.App. Div. 3, 2000) (attached in addendum). In Giese, the Court stated:
"Typically, courts reach this opinion after determining that it is the treating physician
who has the education, expertise, skill, and training necessary to treat a patient and
determine what information a patient must have in order to give informed consent. These
courts recognize that nurses and other nonphysician hospital employees do not normally
possess knowledge of 'a particular patient's medical history, diagnosis, or other
circumstances which would enable the employee to fully disclose all pertinent
information to the patient."' Giese, 567 N.W.2d at 163 (citation omitted); see also
Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 832 P.2d 797, 798-99 (N.M. App. 1992) (noting:
"Although a hospital employee has the necessary skill and expertise to perform the
procedure . . . the employee does not necessarily have the requisite knowledge of a
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particular patient's medical history, diagnosis, or other circumstances which would
enable the employee to fully disclose all pertinent information to the patient.").
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court recognized and adopted many of these same
principles, albeit in a slightly different setting, in Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy,
Inc. 2003 UT 43, 79 P.3d 922. In Schaerrer, the plaintiff sued a drug manufacturer and
pharmacy for injuries alleged to have been the result of taking prescription dietary drugs.
See id. Like this case, the plaintiff in Schaerrer asserted both a products liability claim
and a negligence claim. See id. at lfl[6-13. On appeal, the pharmacy argued the learned
intermediary rule precluded the plaintiffs claims against it. Under that rule,
"manufacturers of prescription drugs have a duty to warn only the physician prescribing
the drug, not the end user or patient... [because once the manufacturer warns the
physician about a drug's side effects] [i]t is the physician who is best situated to weigh
the potential risks associated with a prescription drug against the possible benefits of the
drug and the unique needs and susceptibilities of each patient." Id. at f20. The Utah
Supreme Court held: "The physician thus has the ability to combine medical knowledge
and training with an individualized understanding of the patient's needs, and is the best
conduit for any warnings that are deemed necessary." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court discussed the possible chilling effect on the physicianpatient relationship of imposing on a pharmacist an independent obligation to warn
patients about the use of a drug. Specifically, the Court stated, "Requiring a pharmacist

16
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to warn patients of the potential risks of a prescription drug would 'have the effect of
undermining the physician-patient relationship by engendering fear, doubt, and secondguessing.'" Id. at 1(21 (citation omitted); see also Johnson, 832 P.2d at 799. The Court
continued with its admonition against imposing concurrent duties to warn, stating:
"Pharmacists might present patients with confusing or contradictory information, cast
doubt on the propriety of a physician's legitimate exercise of sound medical judgment, or
even refuse to fill valid prescriptions in an effort to avoid liability." Id.
Similarly, imposing an obligation on hospitals to independently obtain informed
consent would interfere with the physician-patient relationship. A hospitals is not in a
position to substitute its judgment for that of the attending or treating physician. Hospital
staff members are less qualified than the attending physician to evaluate medical issues
and recommend a course of treatment. Moreover, as the Court in Schaerrer
contemplated, the potential liability to a hospital for an attending physician's independent
acts could lead a hospital to interfere with a physician's valid exercise of medical
judgment and discretion.
This is not a case where a plaintiff is left without a remedy. Dr. Witte has
acknowledged that she had a duty to discuss Derek's course of treatment with Mr.
Nguyen and to obtain his informed consent for the treatment. In addition to Dr. Witte's
duty, this Court, also, should not impose an independent and concurrent duty on a
hospital to obtain informed consent from a patient. That duty should be the exclusive
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province of the attending physician who has the requisite training, skill, and knowledge
to intelligently discuss the risks and benefits of a medical procedure with the patient.
Finally, for these same reasons, Mr. Nguyen's other arguments to impose a duty
on hospitals also fail. Specifically, Mr. Nguyen argues that other factors, including the
involvement of PCMC's staff in Derek's treatment, the use of PCMC equipment for his
care, and PCMC's policies, impose an independent duty on PCMC to obtain informed
consent. Each of these factors relate to the treatment Derek received while at PCMC;
however, the factors do not cut against the overriding policy and recognition that the duty
to obtain informed consent rests with the attending physician. The person who obtains
informed consent should be the person who is most qualified and best equipped to discuss
the risks and benefits with the patient. If any one of the factors created an independent
duty, this independent duty would undermine the physician-patient relationship and
create conflict and confusion.
The trial court recognized that the majority of courts have declined to impose
independent duties on hospitals to obtain informed consent. PCMC provided the trial
court with citations to decisions rejecting each of these proffered grounds for imposing an
independent duty. See Barbato v. Livingston, No. 16986/04, 2008 WL 269627, *6 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct, Jan. 23, 2008) (declining to impose duty on hospital when staff were involved in
surgery); Krane v. Saint Anthony Hospital Systems, 738 P.2d 75, 77-78 (Colo. Ct. App.
1987) (same); Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 479 (Conn. 1990) (in adopting policies,
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hospital did not assume a responsibility greater than the law imposed upon it already and
by enacting polices the hospital merely sought to increase the likelihood that doctors
would obtain patients' informed consent).
Adopting Mr. Nguyen's argument would run contrary to public policy of
preserving the physician-patient relationship. Imposing an independent duty to obtain
informed consent upon a hospital would unduly interfere with the physician-patient
relationship. See Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 772 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Wash. App. 1989)
(holding that imposing a duty upon a hospital intervene in the physician-patient
relationship to obtain informed consent would be far more disruptive than beneficial to
the patient); see also Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 832 P.2d 797, 798 (N.M. App.
1992) (holding that to impose a duty upon a hospital to obtain informed consent would
unnecessarily interfere with the physician-patient relationship); Purnell v. Cedars-Sinai
Med Or., No. BC319741, 2007 WL 2938438, *9 (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 10, 2007)
(recognizing that several jurisdictions have recognized that imposing a duty upon a
hospital to obtain informed consent detrimentally interferes with the physician-patient
relationship). The Utah Supreme Court recognized the importance of this policy and
adopted it in Schaerrer.
In certain instances, a hospital could be vicariously liable if its employee physician
fails to obtain informed consent; however, this is not the issue here. Mr. Nguyen has not
presented any evidence to establish that Dr. Witte is an employee of PCMC or
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Intermountain Health Care. (R. at 5839.) In fact, his remaining claim against the
University of Utah relies on facts - which no party has disputed - that demonstrate Dr.
Witte was at all times employed by the University.
PCMC requests this Court to affirm the trial court's ruling that PCMC did not
have an independent or concurrent duty to obtain Mr. Nguyen's informed consent. Derek
Nguyen's medical treatment required assessment of several different life-threatening
injuries. The treatment of Derek's injuries was not necessarily compatible with one
another and, in fact, could exacerbate other conditions. Dr. Witte was uniquely qualified
to assess the injuries and recommend treatment for Derek. Dr. Witte understood that
transporting Derek out of the PICU to the radiology department for a CT scan presented
risks to Derek; however, her professional judgment was that the possible benefit from the
additional information a CT scan could provide outweighed the risks of doing nothing
and keeping Derek in the PICU. In her opinion, Dr. Witte believed Derek would die if
she could not isolate or eliminate causes of his deteriorating condition. The only way she
could obtain this information was with a CT scan of Derek's brain. Accordingly, Dr.
Witte, who was Derek's attending physician, discussed her diagnosis and plan with Mr.
Nguyen and made the decision to do what she could to save Derek's life. This Court
should decline to impose a duty on PCMC that would interfere or undermin Dr. Witte's
relationship with Mr. Nguyen.
II.

The law of the case did not foreclose the trial court from ruling that PCMC
did not have an independent duty to obtain informed consent.
20
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This Court's prior opinion did not hold that PCMC had a duty to obtain informed
consent and expressly contemplated this issue could be resolved at trial or through some
other disposition. "The 'law of the case' is a legal doctrine under which a decision made
on an issue during one stage of a case is binding on successive stages of the same
litigation." Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995). This
doctrine, however, does not foreclose a trial court from ruling on issues that were not
addressed by the appellate court. See Madsen v. Washington Mut. Bank FSB, 2008 UT
69 ,T|24, 199 P.3d 898. Although the issue of informed consent was raised in the parties'
briefs in the first appeal, the issue of whether a hospital has an independent duty to obtain
informed consent was not addressed in this Court's opinion. Accordingly, the trial court
properly ruled on the issue.
In Madsen, Washington Mutual filed motions to dismiss arguing that the Madsens'
claims must fail as a matter of law on two grounds: (1) pursuant to the parties' contract,
and (2) federal preemption barred the claim. Id. at ^5. The district court dismissed the
Madsens' claims based only upon the parties' contract. On appeal, the Utah Supreme
Court reversed and remanded on alternative grounds. Id. ^[ 6-7. On remand, the district
court denied Washington Mutual's motion for summary judgment based on federal
preemption. Washington Mutual appealed a second time, arguing that the district court
erred in denying the motion on federal preemption. Id. at ^[16. The Madsens argued that
the district court properly denied the motion based upon the law of the case doctrine.
21
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Specifically, the Madsens argued that because federal preemption would destroy the
Madsens' cause of action, the appellate court "would have been forced to affirm the trial
court's dismissal" on that basis during the first appeal. Id. at ^[26. Because the appellate
court did not address federal preemption in the first appeal, the Madsens presumed that
the court had ruled on Washington Mutual's federal preemption claim on the merits.
The Utah Supreme Court rejected the Madsens' argument, and held that declining
to rule on an alternative ground cannot be construed as a ruling on the merits of the
alternative ground and is not binding on the trial court on remand. See id. at ^}26.
Accordingly, the decision not to reach an alternative ground is not binding on the court
below, particularly when the court's decision does not include any reference to the
alternative ground. See id.
Similarly, Mr. Nguyen argues that the appellate court necessarily ruled on whether
PCMC had a duty to obtain informed consent and was subject to liability because the
appellate court otherwise would been forced to affirm the trial court's dismissal.
Specifically, Mr. Nguyen argues that the letter, spirit, and circumstances of the appellate
court's opinion assume that PCMC owed an independent duty to obtain informed
consent. Mr. Nguyen reads too much into this Court's opinion.
PCMC's legal duty to obtain informed consent was an alternative ground for
dismissal that this Court chose not to address. See Nguyen, 2010 UT App. 85, ^ 1 6 - 1 8 ,
232 P.3d 529. The decision not to address this alternative ground does not amount to a
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ruling on the merits. Unlike Thurston v. Box Elder County, this Court's prior ruling does
not expressly address the issue at hand. Furthermore, neither the letter nor the spirit of
this Court's opinion indicates that PCMC owed Mr. Nguyen an independent duty of care
to obtain informed consent. Instead, this Court reversed the ruling of the trial court
"because the trial court's sole rationale given for granting summary judgment was the
absence of expert testimony." Nguyen, 2010 UT App. 85, ^18. The Court expressed no
opinion on whether PCMC had a duty to obtain informed consent, and this Court's
silence cannot be construed as a ruling on the merits. Madsen, 2008 UT 69,at ^26.
Therefore, the law of the case doctrine did not preclude the trial court from ruling on
PCMC's Motion for Summary Judgment because this matter was not previously decided
by this Court in Nguyen v. IHC Health Services. Inc., 2010 UT App. 85, 232 P.3d 529.
Indeed, this Court's opinion expressly contemplates that the issue of informed consent
could be resolved through a trial "or such other disposition as may now be proper." Id. at
T|l 8. As to PCMC, the "such other disposition" was a motion for summary judgment.

CONCLUSION
PCMC requests this Court to affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment
on the grounds that PCMC owes no independent duty to obtain informed consent from
Mr. Nguyen. Dr. Witte was Derek's attending physician, and as such, Dr. Witte had the
duty to obtain informed consent. To impose an independent or concurrent duty on
PCMC would potentially undermine and interfere with the physician-patient relationship
23
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and run contrary to the policy adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Schaerrer.
Accordingly, this Court should decline to impose a duty on PCMC.
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care.
78B-3-406. Failure to obtain informed consent -- Proof required of patient —
Defenses — Consent to health care.
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered by a health care provider, it is presumed
that actions taken by the health care provider are either expressly or impliedly authorized to be
done. For a patient to recover damages from a health care provider in an action based upon the
provider's failure to obtain informed consent, the patient must prove the following:
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed between the patient and health care provider;
(b) the health care provider rendered health care to the patient;
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the health care rendered;
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a substantial and significant risk of causing the
patient serious harm;
(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial and significant risk;
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would not have consented to the
health care rendered after having been fully informed as to all facts relevant to the decision to
give consent; and
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care rendered was the proximate cause of personal
injuries suffered by the patient.
(2) In determining what a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would do
under the circumstances, the finder of fact shall use the viewpoint of the patient before health
care was provided and before the occurrence of any personal injuries alleged to have arisen
from said health care.
(3) It shall be a defense to any malpractice action against a health care provider based upon
alleged failure to obtain informed consent if:
(a) the risk of the serious harm which the patient actually suffered was relatively minor;
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from the health care provider was commonly
known to the public;
(c) the patient stated, prior to receiving the health care complained of, that he would accept
the health care involved regardless of the risk; or that he did not want to be informed of the
matters to which he would be entitled to be informed;
(d) the health care provider, after considering all of the attendant facts and circumstances,
used reasonable discretion as to the manner and extent to which risks were disclosed, if the
health care provider reasonably believed that additional disclosures could be expected to have
a substantial and adverse effect on the patient's condition; or
(e) the patient or his representative executed a written consent which sets forth the nature
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and purpose of the intended health care and which contains a declaration that the patient
accepts the risk of substantial and serious harm, if any, in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial
results of health care and which acknowledges that health care providers involved have
explained his condition and the proposed health care in a satisfactory manner and that all
questions asked about the health care and its attendant risks have been answered in a manner
satisfactory to the patient or his representative.
(4) The written consent shall be a defense to an action against a health care provider based
upon failure to obtain informed consent unless the patient proves that the person giving the
consent lacked capacity to consent or shows by clear and convincing evidence that the
execution
of the written consent was induced by the defendant's affirmative acts of fraudulent
misrepresentation or fraudulent omission to state material facts.
(5) This act may not be construed to prevent any person 18 years of age or over from
refusing to consent to health care for his own person upon personal or religious grounds.
(6) Except as provided in Section 76-7-304.5, the following persons are authorized and
empowered to consent to any health care not prohibited by law:
(a) any parent, whether an adult or a minor, for the parent's minor child;
(b) any married person, for a spouse;
(c) any person temporarily standing in loco parentis, whether formally serving or not, for
the minor under that person's care and any guardian for the guardian's ward;
(d) any person 18 years of age or over for that person's parent who is unable by reason of
age, physical or mental condition, to provide such consent;
(e) any patient 18 years of age or over;
(f) any female regardless of age or marital status, when given in connection with her
pregnancy or childbirth;
(g) in the absence of a parent, any adult for the adult's minor brother or sister; and
(h) in the absence of a parent, any grandparent for the grandparent's minor grandchild.
(7) A person who in good faith consents or authorizes health care treatment or procedures
for another as provided by this act may not be subject to civil liability.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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Before Judges McHugh, Orme, and Thorne.
ORME, Judge:
ill
Buu Nguyen appeals the district court's exclusion of his
expert and the resulting dismissal of his claims for negligence
and failure to obtain informed consent, as well as the court's
grant of summary judgment on his intentional infliction of
emotional distress and punitive damages claims. We affirm the
district court's decisions, except as concerns the claim premised
on failure to obtain informed consent. With respect to that
claim, we reverse and remand.
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BACKGROUND
H2
Nguyen was the father of one-year-old Derek Nguyen. Derek
was admitted into the pediatric intensive care unit (PICU) at
Primary Children's Medical Center (PCMC) as a result of severe
injuries he sustained in a car accident. Dr. Madeline Witte, a
University of Utah School of Medicine employee, was responsible
for Derek's care while at PCMC. During Derek's treatment, Dr.
Witte concluded that a CT scan was necessary to determine if
bleeding or a blood clot in Derek's brain was causing his
deteriorating condition. The CT scanner was located on a
different floor of the hospital, so a transport ventilator was
used to facilitate Derek's transfer. The ventilator was a sales
model of the unit that PCMC was considering purchasing. Derek
was placed on the ventilator for approximately an hour before the
transport and was transported only after it was determined that
the ventilator would provide the support needed. While returning
to the PICU after the CT scan, the ventilator lost power.
Resuscitation attempts failed, and Derek died.
1(3
PCMC had developed a procedure to test and evaluate
equipment it was considering for purchase, such as the
ventilator. The process included identifying the type of
appropriate test-patient and the need to obtain consent from the
patient's parent before the equipment was used. Dr. Witte
acknowledged in her deposition that the ventilator was only
supposed to be used on "moderately ill" patients. She also
stated that while Derek's father was told "that there was some
risk involved" in transporting Derek, he was not told that the
ventilator was a test model. According to Dr. Witte, she used
the ventilator not as part of the testing process, but only
because the ventilator was the only machine "available that [she]
had confidence could deliver the level of support that Derek was
requiring." However, several people accompanied Derek as he was
moved to observe the ventilator in action. Significantly, this
group included a representative from the ventilator manufacturer.
1|4
Following an investigation regarding the ventilator's
malfunction, Dr. Witte met with Nguyen and told him that the
ventilator quit working because: "a screw had made contact with
the motherboard resulting in shutdown of the ventilator." Dr. .
Witte also told Nguyen "that the malfunction of the ventilator
clearly played a role in the timing of [Derek]'s death" but that
Derek's severe injuries "could very possibly have resulted in his
demise even in the absence of a ventilator malfunction."
H5
Nguyen filed a complaint against IHC Health Services, Inc.,
doing business as PCMC; University of Utah Hospitals and Clinics;
University of Utah; and the State of Utah (collectively,
Defendants) alleging negligence, failure to obtain informed
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consent, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
recklessness that justified punitive damages.1 After a July 23,
2008 hearing, the district court granted Defendants' motions for
partial summary judgment on the claims of intentional infliction
of emotional distress and punitive damages. The court also
granted Defendants' motion to exclude Dr. John Goldenring from
testifying as Nguyen's expert. Because "[Nguyen] ha [d] failed to
offer admissible expert testimony to establish either a breach of
the applicable standard of care or causation," the court granted
Defendants' summary judgment motion for the remaining claims of
negligence and failure to obtain informed consent. Nguyen
appeals the court's rulings.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
%6 Nguyen asserts that the trial court incorrectly granted
summary judgment on his claims. A court shall grant summary
judgment when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
A summary judgment movant, on an issue
where the nonmoving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, may satisfy its
burden on summary judgment by showing, by
reference to the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any,
that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. Upon such a showing, whether or not
supported by additional affirmative factual
evidence, the burden then shifts to the
nonmoving party, who may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of the pleadings,
but must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Qrvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^ 18, 177 P.3d 600 (emphasis in
original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "We
evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment," Doctors' Co. v. Drezga, 2 0 09 UT 60,
i| 9, 218 P. 3d 598, and "review a district court's decision to
1. Nguyen's complaint also included claims of strict product
liability, negligence, and breach of warranty against Pulmonetic
Systems, Inc., the ventilator's manufacturer. However, these
claims were dismissed after Nguyen reached a settlement with
Pulmonetic Systems, Inc.
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grant summary judgment for correctness, giving no deference to
the district court," Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 61, % 10, 221
P.3d 219.
^7
Nguyen also argues that the court improperly excluded Dr.
Goldenring from testifying as an expert. "District courts
generally enjoy considerable latitude in making evidentiary
rulings, including rulings concerning the qualifications of
expert witnesses under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
In most instances, therefore, we will disturb such rulings only
when the district court has exceeded its discretion." Carbaugh
v. Asbestos Corp., 2007 UT 65, 1 7, 167 P.3d 1063.
ANALYSIS
I.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

*|J8 The district court properly granted Defendants' summary
judgment motion on Nguyen's claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Nguyen's complaint alleged that Defendants
acted outrageously by "using [Derek] as a test subject for, and
as part of a sales demonstration of the Pulmonetic ventilator,"
an untested ventilator, without, obtaining Nguyen's consent. In
responding to Defendants' summary judgment motion, Nguyen claimed
that Defendants did not follow their own guidelines established
for testing the ventilator and that " [n]o emergency existed to
justify disregard of the protocols."
%9
Defendants argued in their summary judgment memoranda that
even if all of Nguyen's assertions could be proven, the conduct
as described did not establish that Defendants acted
outrageously, as is required to prove a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress,2 see Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist.,
2. "Due to the highly subjective and volatile nature of
emotional distress and the variability of its causations, the
courts have historically been wary of dangers in opening the door
to recovery therefor." Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist., 2008 UT 70,
1 51, 194 P. 3d 956 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
In order to properly state a claim for
the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, a plaintiff must plead
facts that demonstrate that the defendant
intentionally engaged in some conduct toward
the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of
inflicting emotional distress, or, (b) where
(continued...)

20080738-CA

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 4
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2008 UT 70, H 51, 194 P.3d 956. "To be considered outrageous,
[t]he conduct must evoke outrage or revulsion; it must be more
than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair. Furthermore, [a]n act is
not necessarily outrageous merely because it is tortious,
injurious, or malicious, or because it would give rise to
punitive damages, or because it is illegal."3 Franco v. Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2001 UT 25, % 28, 21 P.3d
198 (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). Given Utah case law, the district court
correctly ruled that any failure to follow the testing protocol
under the circumstances of this case did not "amount [] to
evidence of outrageous conduct."4
2.

(...continued)
any reasonable person would have known that
such would result; and his actions are of
such a nature as to be considered outrageous
and intolerable in that they offend against
the generally accepted standards of decency
and morality.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
3. Nguyen cites authority for the proposition that the jury, not
the court, should determine if conduct is outrageous. See
Gulbraa v. Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints, 2007 UT App 126, H 23, 159 P.3d 392. However, "[i]f
the trial court determines that a defendant's conduct was not
outrageous as a matter of law, then the plaintiff's claim fails,
and a court may properly grant the defendant summary judgment on
an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim." Oman v.
Davis Sch. Dist., 2008 UT 70, % 52, 194 P.3d 956 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court makes an
initial determination "whether the defendant's conduct may
reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit
recovery." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Accord Schuurman v. Shinqleton, 2001 UT 52, i| 23, 26 P.3d 227.
"Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury . . . to
determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been
sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability."
Oman, 2008 UT 70, i| 52 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
4. There is admittedly limited case law in Utah exploring
intentional infliction of emotional distress in a medical
setting. The leading case is Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2006 UT App
340, 143 P.3d 295, aff'd, 2008 UT 8, 177 P.3d 614. In Sorensen,
we concluded that, where the plaintiff's former physician "not
(continued...)
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4 . (...continued)
only communicated ex parte with defense counsel [but] actually
became a paid advocate for [the plaintiff]'s adversary," the
alleged conduct was sufficient "to maintain an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress." 2006 UT App 340,
^ 21 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has held, albeit in a case
involving a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
that mistakenly using the wrong donor's sperm did not create
sufficient emotional distress to establish such a claim. See
Harchiner v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 68, 72
(Utah 1998). But appellate opinions that have arisen in other
contexts make clear, as a matter of law, that conduct must be
more outrageous than was the failure to follow the testing
protocol as alleged in this case. See Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d
685, 687-88 (Utah 1995) (determining that proposing marriage,
allowing a ceremony to be planned, and then withdrawing the
promise to marry "only hours before the time scheduled for the
ceremony" because the defendant had been married to another
person the entire time "may very well be considered outrageous")
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Pentecost v.
Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 700 (Uteih 1985) (" [A] negations that [her
landlord] 'forcefully' evicted her and her children when she held
the premises under lease and had tendered the rent due, that he
retained all of her personal possessions without contractual or
judicial sanction, and that all of this was done intentionally
and with malice certainly would state . . . a claim" for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.); Samms v. Eccles,
11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344, 345, 347 (1961) (allegation that
"the defendant repeatedly and persistently called [the plaintiff]
by phone at various hours including late at night, soliciting her
to have illicit sexual relations with him; and that on one
occasion [he] came to her residence in connection with such a
solicitation and made an indecent exposure of his person" was
sufficient to withstand dismissal); Gulbraa v. Corporation of the
Pres. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2007 UT
App 126, <n 20, 23-24, 159 P.3d 392 (determining that a
plaintiff's allegations that church officials "conspired with
federal fugitives, wanted on kidnapping charges, to conceal the
. . . [C]hildren and to interfere with Plaintiff's custodial and
parental rights," and "knowingly making false representations to
. . . Plaintiff regarding [the C]hildren's [c]hurch activities"
was sufficiently outrageous for Plaintiff's claim to be heard by
the jury) (alterations and omissions in original). See also
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, H 55, 116 P.3d 323 ("A
mere allegation of improper filing of a lawsuit or the use of
legal process against an individual does not state a claim for
(continued...)
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UlO Furthermore, the district court correctly determined that no
evidence established that Defendants intended to cause emotional
distress. See generally Oman, 2008 UT 70, % 51. In responding
to Defendants' motions for summary judgment, Nguyen did not
dispute that "Dr. Madeline Witte determined that a CT scan was
critical to assess Derek's ongoing problems" and that " [b]efore
Derek was transported to the CT scanner, he was placed on the
Pulmonetics ventilator for approximately an hour to insure that
the ventilator would provide Derek with the requisite levels of
support." This evidence demonstrates, as a matter of law, that
Defendants' actions in using the ventilator were not outrageous
or done to intentionally cause emotional harm to Nguyen.
Therefore, the district court correctly granted Defendants'
summary judgment motions on the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims.
II.

Punitive Damages

111 The district court also properly granted PCMC's summary
judgment motion on Nguyen's punitive damages claim. Nguyen
argued that summary judgment on this claim was inappropriate
because PCMC acted in "knowing and reckless disregard [of
Derek's] safety" by attaching the critically ill and unstable
child to the untested ventilator for purposes of evaluating the
ventilator, by not consulting with other members of Derek's
health care team about using the ventilator, by not following the
established protocol for using the ventilator, and by not
informing Nguyen that they were going to use an untested
ventilator on Derek. We agree with the district court and PCMC
that even if all those facts were established, they would not, as
a matter of law, justify a punitive damages award because they
4 . (. ..continued)
outrageous or intolerable conduct[.]") (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, 2001 UT 25, U 29, 21 P.3d 198 (referring a
sexually abused child to a practitioner that, unbeknownst to the
referrer, was not licensed, was not considered outrageous
conduct); Covert v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 23 Utah 2d 252, 461
P.2d 466, 468-69 (1969) (determining that "mutilation or
desecration of" a body done while extracting the body in an
attempt to save the person's life does not constitute intentional
infliction of emotional distress) ; Robertson v. Utah Fuel Co.,
889 P.2d 1382, 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("The mere fact that
[the plaintiff] was discharged, coupled with the fact that he was
purportedly required to discuss his drug addiction with his
subordinates, does not rise to the level of outrageousness or
intolerable conduct necessary to establish a prima facie claim of
emotional distress."), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995).
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would not establish that PCMC's actions amounted to "conduct that
manifest [ed] a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a
disregard of, the rights of others." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-8201(1) (a) (2008) .5
1|l2 Utah law has long recognized that " [s] imple negligence will
never suffice as a basis upon which [punitive] damages may be
awarded. 'Punitive damages are not awarded for mere
inadvertence, mistake, errors of judgment and the like, which
constitute ordinary negligence.'" Behrens v. Raleigh Hills
Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 908 cmt. b at 465 (1979)). " [T]he defendant
must either know or should know 'that such conduct would, in a
high degree of probability, result in substantial harm to
another,' and the conduct must be 'highly unreasonable conduct,
or an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where
a high degree of danger is apparent.'" Id. at 1187 (citations
omitted). The facts alleged by Nguyen, when considered along
with the undisputed facts previously identified, could at most
prove negligence. The facts do not establish willful, malicious,
or reckless conduct. The grant of summary judgment on the
punitive damages claim was therefore proper.6
III.

Exclusion of Nguyen's Expert

Kl3 The district court also properly excluded Dr. Goldenring as
an expert on the issues of the applicable standard of care and
causation. "Practitioners in one specialty are not ordinarily
competent to testify as experts on the standard of care
applicable in another specialty." Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d
1307, 1310 (Utah 1993).

5.

According to the cited provision,
punitive damages may be awarded only if
compensatory or geneiral damages are awarded
and it is established by clear and convincing
evidence that the acts or omissions of the
tortfeasor are the result of willful and
malicious or intentionally fraudulent
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing
and reckless indifference toward, and a
disregard of, the rights of others.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-8-20M1) (a) (2008) .
6. The district court also ruled that punitive damages were
inappropriate against the University of Utah based on the
Governmental Immunity Act, see Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-201 (2008).
Nguyen does not challenge this ruling on appeal.
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[A] medical expert witness brought in to
testify on the applicable standard of care,
and whose specialty differs from that of the
allegedly negligent doctor, must show that he
or she is knowledgeable about the applicable
standard of care or that the standard of care
in the expert's specialty is the same as the
standard of care in the alleged negligent
doctor's specialty.
Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
^|14 Dr. Goldenring practiced general pediatrics and had never
worked as a critical care physician in a PICU. Although he has
provided some emergency care in hospitals as an attending
pediatrician, he specified that he always worked in the "team
context" with specialists because "[i]t's not appropriate for a
general pediatrician to take on a really bad case . . . without
getting lots of help." Since 1994 or 1995, Dr. Goldenring has
not used any active hospital privileges and had primarily worked
for HMOs and individual practice associations as an administrator
or consultant. He also had no experience with the ventilator
used in this case, is not an expert on ventilators generally, and
had no experience writing test protocols for hospital equipment.
In addition, Dr. Goldenring frankly conceded in rendering his
causation opinions that he was unable to quantify Derek's chance
of survival absent the ventilator failure. For these reasons, we
affirm the district court's decision to exclude Dr. Goldenring
from testifying as an expert regarding the applicable standard of
care and causation.
IV.

Medical Negligence

^|15 Because Dr. Goldenring was not qualified to testify about
the essential elements of Nguyen's medical negligence claim, the
district court properly granted Defendants summary judgment on
the claim.7 Without an expert, Nguyen simply would be unable to
7. Ordinarily when a defendant moves for summary judgment, the
defendant must show that no material facts are in dispute and the
defendant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(c); Eagar v. Burrows, 2008 UT 42, 1H 13, 15-16, 191
P.3d 9 (discussing burdens of proof when defendant moves for
summary judgment). Medical negligence cases are often on a
somewhat different footing. In order to prove the applicable
standard of care, the breach of that standard, and that the
breach was the proximate cause of the injury, an expert is
ordinarily needed. See Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Caref
(continued...)
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prove that the standard of care had been breached. See Chadwick
v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("Due to the
technical and complex nature of a medical doctor's services,
expert medical testimony must be presented at trial in order to
establish the standard of care and proximate cause--except in
unusual circumstances."); Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health
Care, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (noting importance
of expert testimony in medical malpractice actions "to establish:
1) the standard of care, 2) defendant's failure to comply with
that standard, and 3) that defendant caused plaintiff's
injuries") (citations omitted).
V.

Failure to Obtain Informed Consent

1|16 The district court improperly dismissed Nguyen's claim for
failure to obtain informed consent. The court based its
dismissal on the fact that Nguyen's expert could not "expertly
address what information should or should not have been conveyed
about the overall risks and benefits of the transport." Nguyen
argues on appeal, and we agree, that he did not need an expert to
establish Defendants' failure to obtain informed consent to use
the ventilator. 8
7 . ( ...continued)
740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). With that requirement in
mind, Defendants claim that they are entitled to prevail because
Nguyen would be legally unable to make out a prima facie case
without an expert, meaning his claim would fail as a matter of
law. We have previously recognized that summary judgment is
appropriate in cases where the plaintiff lacks required expert
testimony and there is no way that the plaintiff can make out a
prima facie case for medical negligence without such testimony.
See id. at 2 71.
8.

For a patient to recover damages from a
health care provider in an action based upon
the provider's failure to obtain informed
consent, the patient must prove the
following:
(a) that a provider-patient relationship
existed between the patient and health care
provider;
(b) the health care provider rendered
health care to the patient;
(c) the patient suffered personal
injuries arising out of the health care
rendered;
(d) the health care rendered carried
(continued...)
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Hl7 Often, an expert is needed to determine if the information
provided in the course of securing informed consent was adequate.
See generally Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 533 (Utah 1984)
("Evidence of what information a patient should have to be able
to give informed consent was given by the plaintiff's expert.");
Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 821 n.4 (stating that "at a minimum, expert
testimony is required in cases alleging a lack of informed
consent to prove the materiality of the risk involved").
However, in this case, Nguyen bases his claim not on perceived
deficiencies in the disclosures made, but on the complete absence
of any disclosure about the untested nature of the ventilator and
the risks of its use. If Nguyen's theory had been that
disclosures were made to him but the disclosures were misstated
or did not include material information, such as the fact that
FDA approval was relatively recent or that there was a
possibility a screw might come loose and cause the ventilator to
malfunction, then it may well be that Nguyen would need an expert
to establish exactly what information he was entitled to have
disclosed to him. See Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 821 n.4. Instead,
Nguyen claims that he was entitled to know one basic fact, the
obvious importance of which does not require an expert to
explain--i.e., that this ventilator was unproven and was being
tested by the hospital to determine if it should be purchased.9

8.

( .. .continued)
with it a substantial and significant risk of
causing the patient serious harm;
(e) the patient was not informed of the
substantial and significant risk;
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the
patient's position would not have consented
to the health care rendered after having been
fully informed as to all facts relevant to
the decision to give consent; and
(g) the unauthorized part of the health
care rendered was the proximate cause of
personal injuries suffered by the patient.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-406(l) (2008).
9. We note that the record shows that some general information
was given to Nguyen about the need for Derek to be transported to
receive a CT scan and "that there was a risk involved with this
process." However, it appears even from Defendants' account that
no information was given to Nguyen regarding the fact that the
ventilator was not regular hospital equipment and that it was
being tested by PCMC so it could evaluate whether the ventilator
should be purchased.

20080738-CA

11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

%18 "Where the physician fails to disclose to his patient any
information concerning a material fact, there is no question of
skill and judgment, no question of practice beyond the knowledge
of laymen which must be established through expert testimony."
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 355 (Utah 1980) (emphasis
added). An expert is not needed to establish that Nguyen should
have been informed that the ventilator was in the hospital on a
trial basis for experimental purposes; that it was still under
evaluation; that it was actually intended for "life flight"
transport; and, most importantly, that the ventilator had not
once been used on a patient. Cf. id. at 352 ("[E]xpert testimony
is unnecessary to establish the standard of care owed the
plaintiff where the propriety of the treatment received is within
the common knowledge and experience of the layman. The loss of a
surgical instrument or other paraphernalia, in the operating
site, exemplifies this type of treatment."). Because there was a
total absence of any disclosure about the ventilator's
experimental status and because the court's sole rationale given
for granting summary judgment was the absence of expert
testimony, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of
Defendants on the claim of failure to obtain informed consent.
On that claim, we remand for trial or such other disposition as
may now be proper.
CONCLUSION
Hl9 The district court properly granted summary judgment to
Defendants on Nguyen's claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, punitive damages, and negligence. And the
district court properly excluded Nguyen's expert. However, the
district court erred in relying on the lack of expert testimony
in granting summary judgment on Nguyen's claim for failure to
obtain informed consent. That claim is remanded to the trial
court. The parties will bear their own costs on appeal.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

i|20

I CONCUR:

Carolyn B. McHugh,
Associate Presiding Judge
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THORNE, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
1)21 I concur in parts III, IV, and V. I respectfully dissent
from parts I and II. I disagree with the majority opinion that
the district court properly granted Defendants' summary judgment
motions on Nguyen's claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and punitive damages claim.
^22 In particular, I disagree with the majority's conclusion
that the district court correctly granted Defendants' summary
judgment motion for intentional infliction of emotional distress
because no evidence existed to show, as a matter of law, that
Defendants intended to cause emotional distress or that the
conduct was outrageous. See supra HI 9, 10. The evidence in
this case is such that a reasonable person might conclude that
Defendants' conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous
to result in liability. Under the circumstances of this case, it
would be possible for a jury to reasonably find that Defendants
acted in an outrageous manner.
^|23 The evidence before the trial court included testimony that
at the time of its use on Derek the sales model ventilator had
not been tested, attached to, or previously used to transport
anyone; a committee was assembled to test, evaluate, and acquire
a new life-flight transport ventilator (the CTM committee); a
clinical evaluation previously scheduled had not taken place as
arranged; Defendants' agents were subject to rules governing use
of the sales model, which prohibited use on any critically-ill or
medically unstable child without obtaining parental consent;
Derek was critically ill and medically unstable, and Defendants'
agents did not obtain the consent of Derek's father; Defendants'
agent Dr. Madeline Witte, a CTM committee member, decided to use
the sales model on Derek; Defendant's agent Tammy Bleak,
chairperson of the CTM committee, had a duty to assess the
reliability of the sales model for patient use pursuant to the
hospital's testing and evaluation requirements before allowing
its use on a patient outside of the testing and evaluation
parameters; the sales model was used on Derek in the presence of
the salesman and personnel assigned to evaluate the sales model;
Ramsey Worman, a CTM committee member, testified that he felt
inspection of the ventilator was inadequate and he disagreed with
the decision to test it on any patients; and during transport the
sales model malfunctioned and Derek died.
i|24 Based on this evidence reasonable minds could differ on
whether Defendants' actions would "evoke outrage or revulsion"
sufficient to be considered outrageous conduct. See Oman v.
Davis Sch. Dis't., 2008 UT 70, ^ 53, 194 P.3d 956 (internal
quotation marks omitted). A reasonable jury could determine that
Defendants' agents' actions were motivated by the need to test
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the sales model and in complete disregard of the potential risk
to the critically-ill child who may not be able to tolerate a
brief interruption, and conclude that such actions constituted
outrageous conduct. "Where reasonable men may differ, it is for
the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine
whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been
sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability." Id.
% 52 (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, I disagree
with the majority that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
^|25 I also disagree with the majority's determination that the
district court properly granted Defendants' summary judgment
motion on Nguyen's punitive damages claim. Based on the same
facts and conduct summarized above, a reasonable jury could
determine that Defendants' actions to pursue testing of the sales
model despite the risks to the critically-ill child were "willful
and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct
that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a
disregard of, the rights of others," see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-8201(1)(a) (2008), as required for Nguyen to prove he is entitled
to punitive damages. Therefore, I would hold that the grant of
summary judgment on the punitive damages claim was also improper.
^|26 I would reverse and remand the matter for a trial on the
merits of Nguyen's claims of intentional infliction of emotional
distress and punitive damages.

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
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("PCMC") was represented by its counsel, Robert G. Wright and Brandon B. Hobbs RICHARDS
BRANDT MILLER NELSON.

The Court, having heard oral argument from the parties, having

reviewed the relevant pleadings, and otherwise being fully advised, hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES the following:
1.

This Court denies Plaintiffs Motion to Strike PCMC's Motion for Summary

Judgment. The law of the case doctrine does not bar this Court from considering Defendant
PCMC's Motion because the Utah Court of Appeals decision in Nguyen v. IHC Health Services,
Inc., did not hold that PCMC had an independent duty to obtain informed consent. The Utah
Court of Appeals' decision to reverse and remand this matter was based upon the fact that this
Court's "sole rationale . . . for granting summary judgment was the absence of expert testimony."
Nguyen v. IHC Health Services, Inc., 2010 UT App. 85, % 18. The Utah Court of Appeals
remanded this case "for trial or such other disposition as may now be proper." Id. Disposition of
this matter pursuant to PCMC's Motion for Summary Judgment is proper, in accordance with
statutory law, case law, and public policy.
2.

Whether PCMC has an independent duty to obtain informed consent is a purely

legal question subject to this Court's determination.
3.

Utah Code 78B-3-406 does not create an independent duty on the part of PCMC

to obtain informed consent.
4.

Defendant PCMC's hospital policies do not establish an independent duty of care

to obtain informed consent.
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5.

Plaintiff has failed to apply the facts of this matter to the law to establish that an

agency or employment relationship existed between Dr. Witte and PCMC. Therefore, there is no
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Witte is an agent or employee of PCMC.
6.

This Court concludes that the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Schaerrer v.

Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 79 P.3d 922 (Utah 2003), is applicable and recognizes a public
policy to protect the privacy and integrity of the physician-patient relationship. Further,
Schaerrer established that imposing a duty to obtain informed consent on a third party would
"have the effect of undermining the physician-patient relationship by engendering fear, doubt,
and second-guessing." Id. at 929 (citations omitted).
7.

The majority of jurisdictions recognize that a hospital does not have an

independent duty to obtain informed consent and the duty to obtain informed consent rests upon
physicians, who actively manage the patient's care. These jurisdictions recognize that imposing
an independent duty upon a hospital to obtain informed consent from a patient unduly interferes
with the physician-patient relationship, has the potential to undermine the physician-patient
relationship, and leads to patient confusion. See Giese v. Stice, 567 N.W.2d 156 (Neb. 1997); see
also Schaerrer, 79 P.3d at 928-929. These jurisdictions also recognize that the treating
physician, rather than hospital staff members, has the education, expertise, skill, and training
necessary to determine what information the patient requires in order to give informed consent
Id
8.

This Court concludes that the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Giese v.

Sticey 567 N.W.2d 156 (Neb. 1997) is particularly persuasive. In Geise, the court rejected the
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plaintiffs argument that because the hospital supplied the implants used in the patient's surgeries
the hospital had an independent duty to inform the plaintiff regarding the possible side effects
associated with the implants. The court concluded that the hospital did not have a duty to inform
and to hold otherwise would "constitute an unwarranted interference in the physician-patient
relationship." Id. at 164.
9.

This Court concludes that, in this matter, Defendant PCMC did not have an

independent duty to obtain informed consent.
10.

Based upon the foregoing conclusions of law, PCMC's Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED.
11.

Plaintiffs claims and causes of action against Defendant IHC Health Services,

Inc., dba Primary Children's Medical Center are dismissed in their entirety with prejudice and on
the merits. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendant IHC Health Services, Inc., dba
Primary Children's Medical Center.

DATED this

£j?

day of January, 2011.

Honorable Sandra Peuler
Tgtfrd District Court
STAMH UibU AI UlRbCTION OF JUDGE
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NOTE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION, SEE RCWA 2.06.040
Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3.
Steven K. ADAMS, Appellant,
v.

superseding cause and contributory negligence arguing that
there was no evidence to support either. But, the jury's failure
to find primary negligence obviates any error. Steven also
assigns error to the court's standard of care instruction. The
court's instruction was correct. Finally, Steven assigns error
to the court's refusal to instruct on both informed consent and
abandonment. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the
judgment.

Gerald JOHNSTON, M.D., and Jane Doe
Johnston, husband and wife, and the marital
community composed thereof; Sacred Heart
Medical Center; Sacred Heart Medical Center
Employees, John Does and/or Jane Does I-

FACTS
The background facts here are in Adams v. Johnston, 71
Wn.App. 599, 602-03, 860 P.2d 423, 869 P.2d 416 (1993)
(Adams I).

X; Compcare, Inc., d/b/a Nancy Reagon Care
Unit; Deaconess Medical Center Employees,
John Does and/or Jane Does I-X, Defendants;
Deaconess Medical Center, Respondent.
No. 17826-9-III.

April 13, 2000.

Appeal from Superior Court of Spokane County, Docket No.
86-2-04068-9, judgment or order under review, date filed
09/01/1998; Kathleen O'Connor, Judge.
Attorneys and Law Firms
John T. Rodgers, Attorney At Law, Marcia M. Meade,
Dawson & Meade, Spokane, WA, for appellant(s).
Thomas R. Luciani, Attorney At Law, Steven R. Stocker,
Stamper Sherman Stocker & Smith, Spokane, WA, for
respondent(s).
Opinion

UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SWEENEY.
*./ This is a medical malpractice case. It follows the shooting
injury of a father by his schizophrenic, paranoid son. The son
and the family settled with an independent drug and alcohol
treatment facility and its medical director and then proceeded
to trial against Deaconess Medical Center. The jury returned
a defense verdict. Steven Adams, the son, asks us to revisit
our previous ruling that Deaconess was not vicariously liable
for the negligence of the drug and alcohol treatment facility
director. First, our opinion in Adams I is the law of the
case. Second, it was correctly decided. Steven also assigns
error to two of the trial court's instructions on intervening

Steven was one of six children living with his divorced father,
Darwin Adams. After a normal childhood, Steven's behavior
became increasingly bizarre during the first half of 1985. His
father became concerned on learning of Steven's plan to kill
him.
On May 17, 1985, his father took Steven to the
CAREUNIT at Deaconess Medical Center (Deaconess).
CAREUNIT was established when Comprehensive Care
Corporation (CompCare) contracted with Deaconess to
provide management and other services for a drug and alcohol
treatment facility. One of CompCare's contractual obligations
was to hire a medical director. Adams I, 71 Wn.App. at 602.
Steven refused to be admitted to the 28-day inpatient drug
program. Dr. Gerald P. Johnston examined him. Dr. Johnston
transferred Steven to Sacred Heart Medical Center to be
evaluated for possible involuntary commitment. On May
20, a Sacred Heart physician concluded that Steven was a
danger to himself and others, and involuntarily committed
him to Sacred Heart's psychiatric ward. Later that same day,
CAREUNIT's Dr. Johnston determined he could be switched
to voluntary status and transferred back to CAREUNIT. Two
days later, Dr. Johnston was fired. On May 25, Steven walked
away from CAREUNIT against medical advice, and returned
home.
Two and a half months later, Steven shot his father in the head.
Mr. Adams survived with severe permanent brain damage.
Steven was charged with attempted first degree murder. A
sanity commission diagnosed him as schizophrenic, paranoid
type. A superior court judge determined Steven was insane at
the time of the shooting. Steven was committed indefinitely
to Eastern State Hospital.
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In Adams I, the father, Darwin B. Adams and his
children, including Steven, sued Dr. Johnston, CompCare,
and Deaconess. In that suit, the plaintiffs claimed that
Deaconess was liable both in its own right and vicariously
for the negligent management of Steven's medical treatment.
Adams I, 71 Wn.App. at 607. Prior to trial Steven settled his
claims against CompCare for $20,000 and his claims against
Dr. Johnston for $35,000. The remaining plaintiffs settled
with CompCare and Dr. Johnston for $150,000 and $100,000,
respectively. Deaconess opposed the settlements, asking the
court to assign $1 million as a reasonable settlement amount
for Steven and $2 million for the rest. The trial court approved
the settlements and denied Deaconess's motion for partial
summary judgment that it was not vicariously liable for the
acts of Dr. Johnston and CompCare. Adams 1, 71 Wn.App. at
602-03.
*2 On discretionary review, we affirmed the trial court's
conclusion that the settlements were reasonable. Adams I,
71 Wn.App. at 603-04, 607. We went on to hold that
Deaconess had no vicarious liability since no principal-agent
relationship existed. And even if it did, Deaconess was a
disclosed principal and the settlements with the agents were
reasonable, and the settling defendants were solvent. Adams
I, 11 Wn.App. at 607-10.
Steven proceeded with his independent claim of negligence
against Deaconess.
The jury found Deaconess not negligent.

evidence to support it. It, therefore, confused the jury and cast
doubt on the verdict. Olpinski v. Clement, 73 Wn.2d 944,442
P.2d 260 (1968); Reynolds v. Phare, 58 Wn.2d 904, 905, 365
P.2d 328 (1961).
Contributory negligence "can exist only as a coordinate
or counterpart of a defendant's negligence." Heilman v.
Wentworth, 18 Wn.App. 751, 755, 571 P.2d 963 (1977)
(quoting Godfrey v. State, 84 Wn.2d 959, 964, 530 P.2d 630
(1975)). The jury did not find Deaconess negligent. The jury
made no determination of primary negligence of any kind.
It, therefore, would have no reason to deliberate on the issue
of the plaintiffs contributory negligence. The instruction was
therefore harmless, even if erroneous. Steven cites two cases
for the proposition that an erroneous contributory negligence
instruction is per se prejudicial regardless of the outcome.
Neither supports his position.
In Olpinski, the defendant admitted liability and produced not
a scintilla of evidence of contributory negligence. The court,
nevertheless, gave a contributory negligence instruction, and
the jury's verdict was in favor of the defendant. The court's
grant of a new trial was upheld. Olpinski, 73 Wn.2d at
951. In Reynolds, the court held it was prejudicial error to
submit a question to the jury by way of jury instructions
unsupported by evidence in the record. There, the trial court
gave an instruction that if a rider injured on a fairground
attraction seated himself improperly, it would be contributory
negligence. Again, there was not a scintilla of evidence the
plaintiff did not seat himself properly. On a verdict for the
fairground, a new trial was granted. Reynolds, 58 Wn.2d at
906.

DISCUSSION
Deaconess's Vicarious Liability for Dr. Johnston's Conduct.
Steven asks us to revisit our holding in Adams I that
Deaconess is not vicariously liable for Dr. Johnston's conduct.
This we will not do for two reasons: First, Adams I is the
law of the case. Steven presented no new evidence to the trial
court as to the solvency of the settling defendants. He offers
nothing new now.
Second, Adams I correctly applied Glover. No principle of
full compensation will be applied to permit plaintiffs to make
'sweetheart' settlements with solvent agents and then go after
a disclosed principal for more. Adams I, 71 Wn.App. at 609
(citing Glover v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 98 Wn.2d 708, 722-23,
658 P.2d 1230(1983)).
Contributory Negligence Instruction. Steven argues that
the contributory negligence instruction was given without

*3 Here, it was undisputed that Steven checked himself out
of the treatment program against medical advice. The plaintiff
concedes that the family was instructed to call CAREUNIT
if Steven showed up at the family home. They did not do
so. Steven argued that his unbalanced mental state rendered
him incompetent and immune from findings of negligence.
The court disagreed and determined the question was a proper
one for the jury to consider but only if it found Deaconess
negligent.
In Olpinski and Reynolds, the verdicts were inexplicable
other than to speculate that the gratuitous contributory
negligence instruction confused the jury. Here, there was
plenty of evidence on which the jury could have found
Deaconess not negligent, and there was plenty of evidence
that Steven's own conduct contributed to the tragic outcome.
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Steven argues at length that his checking out of CAREUNIT
early did not make him psychotic. But neither did he allege
that Deaconess's conduct made him psychotic. The claim was
that his psychosis was undiagnosed and he was allowed to put
himself in a position where he could act out with tragic results.
Intervening Superseding Cause. An erroneous instruction is
harmless if the jury does not reach the issue addressed in
the instruction. Richards v. Overtake Hosp. Med. Ctr., 59
Wn.App. 266, 276-77, 796 P.2d 737 (1990). So Steven's
assignment of error to the court instructing the jury on
superseding intervening cause fails for the same reasons as
his argument on contributory negligence. Absent a negligent
cause, the notion of a superseding cause has no meaning.
Here, the court clearly instructed the jury as to the two-phase
nature of its deliberations, and that, as to other contributing
causes:
{T}he jury cannot even consider this instruction unless
they make a finding that the defendant is negligent. If
they don't make a finding the defendant is negligent, then
the instruction doesn't kick in. The reason is because
this instruction doesn't go to the negligence of the
defendant. This instruction presupposes the negligence of
the defendant and whether or not the negligence is a
proximate cause of the injury.
So the issue does not become ripe until the jury gets to the
second phase. We all have to remember that.
Steven contends that nothing intervened between Deaconess's
negligent conduct and the onset of his psychosis. Again, it is
not the mental state but the consequences of its manifestation
that the complaint alleges Deaconess was negligent in
preventing. It was not alleged that Deaconess caused Steven's
psychosis. He complained about its failure to diagnose and
manage it.
The record supports the finding that Deaconess was not
negligent. This record also supports the court's instruction on
the legal effect of subsequent events. On this record, the jury
verdict was not caused solely by the instruction, which was
the basis for granting a new trial in Olpinski and Reynolds.
Standard of Care Instruction. Jury instructions are sufficient
if, read in their entirety, they accurately state the law and
allow each side to present its theory of the case. Havens v. C
&D Plastics, Inc., 124Wn.2dl58, 165, 876 P.2d 435 (1994).
The refusal to give a specific instruction is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. Stiley v. Block, 130 Wn.2d 486, 498, 925 P.2d

194 (1996). The language is left to the court's discretion.
Douglas v. Freeman, 117 Wn.2d 242, 256, 814 P.2d 1160
(1991).
*4 Steven contends that the instructions given to his jury
create a multiple choice test to determine the standard of
care. He reasons that Instruction No. 7 refers only to the
'applicable' standard of care, which has no meaning and
invites the jury to apply the wrong standard. The purpose
of Instruction No. 7, however, is to provide a list of all the
elements of negligence that the plaintiff must prove. One of
these is that the defendant failed to follow the 'applicable'
standard of care. Likewise, Steven complains that Instructions
Nos. 12 and 15, which define negligence and superseding
cause in general terms, refer to 'ordinary care,' and that No.
14 defines 'ordinary care.' He contends this invites the jury
to apply the wrong standard.
But Instruction No. 9 instructs the jury unambiguously what
the 'applicable' standard of 'ordinary' care is for a hospital.
No. 9 states: 'A hospital has a duty to exercise the degree
of skill, care, and learning expected of a reasonably prudent
hospital in the State of Washington acting in the same or
similar circumstances at the time of the care o{r} treatment
in question. Failure to exercise such skill, care, or learning is
negligence.'
Steven concedes that the instructions would be sufficient if
they informed the jury that the standard of care is 'reasonable
prudence in exercising the skill, care and learning expected
of a health care provider.' Instruction No. 1 instructs the jury
to apply the instructions as a whole. Taken as a whole, the
instructions inform the jury of the applicable standard with as
much clarity and cogency as is customary. The court correctly
instructed this jury.
Informed Consent. Steven claims that the court erred by
dismissing his informed consent claim. He argues that
because Deaconess was the primary care provider, it had a
duty to obtain informed consent under RCW 7.70.050. And
here, neither Steven nor his father was informed as to the dual
diagnosis of severe mental illness and substance addiction,
the risks and benefits of alternative treatments, or the risk of
receiving no care.
The duty to obtain an informed consent is on the physician,
not the hospital. Alexander v. Gonser, 42 Wn.App. 234, 711
P.2d 347 (1985). Diagnosis is the responsibility of the doctor.
There is no duty to inform a patient of the risks associated with
an undiagnosed condition. Burnet v. Spokane Am bid ance, 54
Wn.App. 162, 168, 772 P.2d 1027 (1989).
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Steven was not diagnosed with a mental illness until after
he shot his father. To find a health care provider liable for
a violation of RCW 7.70.050, the plaintiff must prove: '(1)
the health care provider failed to inform the patient of a
material fact relating to treatment; (2) the patient consented
to treatment without being aware of that fact; (3) a reasonably
prudent patient under similar circumstances would not have
consented given such information; and (4) the treatment in
question proximately caused injury to the patient.' Gonser,
42 Wn.App. at 237. Treatment includes doing nothing. Id. at
237-38. Unless the hospital is vicariously responsible, it is the
physician who has the duty. Id. at 239.
*5 In the absence of a diagnosis of mental illness, there is
no duty to inform the patient of the risks of aggravating the
condition by rejecting a drug and alcohol program.
Abandonment. Finally, Steven argues that the court erred
in not giving his instruction on abandonment. Washington
no longer recognizes a separate tort of abandonment. RCW
7.70.030 requires the medical negligence plaintiff to establish
one or more of the following propositions by a preponderance
of the evidence:
(1) That injury resulted from the failure of a health care
provider to follow the accepted standard of care;

(2) That a health care provider promised the patient or his
representative that the injury suffered would not occur;
(3) That injury resulted from health care to which the
patient or his representative did not consent.
The accepted standard of care requires that once a doctor
starts treatment he or she must continue so long as needed,
unless he or she is discharged or gives reasonable notice so
that the patient can find another doctor. Gray v. Davidson,
15 Wn.2d 257, 266-67, 130 P.2d 341, 136 P.2d 187 (1942).
Whether to put the question to the jury, however, depends on
the individual circumstances. Gross v. Partlow, 190 Wash.
489, 493, 68 P.2d 1034 (1937). Here, it was undisputed
that Steven walked away from the treatment against medical
advice, thus of necessity discharging the doctors.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will
not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will
be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.

KURTZ, C.J., and BROWN, J., concur.
Parallel Citations
2000 WL 464053 (Wash.App. Div. 3)

Footnotes
1

Adams v. Johnston, 71 Wn.App. 599, 860 P.2d 423, 869 P.2d 416 (1993).

2

CAREUNIT and CompCare are registered service marks of Comprehensive Care Corporation. Adams I, 71 Wn.App. at 602 n. 1.

3

Defendant Sacred Heart was dismissed. Adams I, 71 Wn.App. at 602.

4

Glover v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 98 Wn.2d 708, 658 P.2d 1230 (1983). Glover sets forth the factors to be considered on the record in
determining reasonableness of a settlement with less than all the defendants. It holds that if a primarily liable, solvent agent is released
upon a reasonable settlement, the principal cannot be pursued for any remaining damages. Discussed at Adams I, 71 Wn.App. at 609.
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Opinion
THOMAS P. PHELAN, J.
*/ The motions by defendants, Douglas Livingston, D.P.M.
and Michael Livingston, D.P.M. ("Livingston") and New
Island Hospital, for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212 granting
them summary judgment dismissing the complaint against
them is granted. The cross-motion by plaintiffs for an order
pursuant to CPLR 3126 striking the answer of defendant, New
Island Hospital, is denied.
This is an action to recover damages for podiatric
malpractice and lack of informed consent. Plaintiffs allege
that defendants, Livingston, negligently cared for and treated
plaintiff, Deborah Barbato, from August 7, 2002, through
and including November 8, 2002, and that the hospital was
negligent in its care of her when she underwent surgery there
on October 3, 2002.
Defendants seek dismissal of the complaint and plaintiffs
seek to strike the hospital's answer based on its spoliation of
evidence, to wit: radiologic films.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Mrs. Barbato first went to the Livingstons' medical office
on August 7, 2002. She presented with a congenital
condition: a foreshortened and dorsally elevated fourth

toe in her right foot. Her medical chart indicates that she
saw Dr. Douglas Livingston and complained of pain in
the fourth toe of her right foot which was affecting her
gait and causing pain about her right knee. However, at
her examination before trial, Mrs. Barbato testified that
she only complained that her fourth toe was raised and
that she was experiencing blisters. She also testified that
she told Dr. Douglas Livingston that she had taped her
toe down which had affected her gait. Upon examination,
Dr. Douglas Livingston noted a shortened and dorsally
elevated fourth digit on her right foot with pain upon
palpation of the region and that the second and third
digits were deviated laterally. He also noted pain along the
plantar aspect of the fifth metatarsal head region of her right
foot. Mrs. Barbato's medical chart states:
3) Discussed treatment options with patient including
conservative and surgical management of conditions.
Patient states that conservative measures have not been
helpful in reducing her symptoms and is interested
in surgical management. I discussed treatment options
with patient including arthroplasty 4th digit and/or bone
graphing of the 4th metatarsal as well as possible Ilizarov
type procedure in an attempt to lengthen the shortened 4th
metatarsal.
4) Patient will consider all options.
Mrs. Barbato returned to the Livingstons' office for a second
visit on August 28, 2002, and was seen by both of the
Livingston doctors. Her medical chart states:
[Patient] states that she has experienced pain while
standing, walking and in shoe gear and is interested in
surgical management of condition.
Mrs. Barbato's chart further reflects that Dr. Douglas
Livingston discussed all treatment options with [patient]
regarding this condition and regarding the brachymetatarsia
including Ilizarov procedure and bone graft procedure with
external fixation including the recovery period involved
with these procedures. [Patient] states that the recovery is
too extensive regarding external fixation and is interested
in symptomatic relief of the 4th digit as an alternative.
Discussed arthroplasty 2nd, 3rd and 4th digits, right foot
with syndactylization of the 4th digit... [Patient] understands
and all questions answered.... [Patient] is aware that further
surgical procedures may be required including possible
lengthening procedure of 4th [metatarsal]. [Patient] is aware
that this is in attempt to help [patient] with her [symptoms]
and that further surgical procedures may be required.
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*2 Mrs. Barbato testified that at that visit, defendant doctors
told her that she had hammer toes of her second and third
metatarsals and that they, too, should be fixed. Mrs. Barbato
further testified that her hammer toes had never caused her
any problems; and, in fact, she did not even know she had
them. As for surgical options, Mrs. Barbato testified at her
examination before trial that the only nonsurgical options
defendant doctors discussed with her was taping down her
toes, with which she was already familiar. She also testified
that she was not necessarily looking for surgical treatment;
she was "just looking for a way to alleviate the cuts and
blisters on the toe, and if there was anything that could be
done with all the technology that's been going on over the past
few years." (p.31) Mrs. Barbato testified that the possible use
of K-wire in her toe was not discussed. The consent form she
executed does not recite it as a possibility.
Surgery was performed on Mrs. Barbato's right foot by both
of defendant doctors on October 3, 2002, at New Island
Hospital. Mrs. Barbato underwent V to Y skin plasty of her
fourth metatarsophalangeal joint, syndactylization (sewing
together) of her fourth and fifth digits, arthroplasty of her
fifth digit proximate to her interphalangeal joint, tenotomies
and capsulotomies of her second, third, fourth and fifth digits
and K wire fixation of her third digit. On October 4, 2002,
Mrs. Barbato reported to the Livingstons' office with a broken
fifth digit on her left foot. Mrs. Barbato presented again to
the Livingstons' office on October 8, 2002, at which time xrays were taken. Her medical chart indicates that on that day
"[a]ll operative sites lay in their proper rectus and anatomical
position." Although her medical record does not reflect it, at
her examination before trial, Mrs. Barbato testified that she
complained on that day that the pin was causing her pain and
discomfort and that she was simply told that that was normal.
Mrs. Barbato testified at her examination before trial that she
continued to complain about the pin and the doctor told her on
October 15, 2002, that he would remove it on her next visit.
The medical record of October 15,2002, reflects that the "Kwire on the 3rd digit lays in its proper rectus and anatomical
position."
Mrs. Barbato's medical record reflects that Dr. Michael
Livingston removed the pin at her next visit on October
21, 2002, because it was continuing to cause her pain and
discomfort. In fact, Mrs. Barbato testified at her examination
before trial that, after that visit, she was completely unable to
bear any weight.

At her examination before trial, Mrs. Barbato testified that
she subsequently developed a little marble on the bottom of
her foot where her toes began which caused her a lot of pain.
She testified that she felt like she had a knife going through
the top of her foot. Mrs. Barbato testified that she told the
doctor this on her next visit on October 25, 2002, and that
she had very little movement in her second and third toes,
the doctor again simply told her that that was normal. Mrs.
Barbato's medical chart does not reflect such a complaint
and simply indicates that the healing process was proceeding
nicely and that physical therapy had begun. In fact, it notes
that she had decreased edema and pain upon palpation, had
range of motion of the surgical sites, and that all digits lay in
acceptable position at that time.
*3 In fact, Mrs. Barbato's medical charts of October 28,
2002, October 31, 2002, and November 4, 2002, reflect that
she was doing better and was able to wear surgical shoe gear
without any problems or difficulties. Her chart continues to
indicate that "[t]he involved digits lay in their proper rectus
and anatomical positions. There are normal scars present. The
V to Y skin plasty is healing nicely." Her medical chart states
that the "short term goals of reducing pain, inflammation,
swelling and increasing ROM [range of motion] had been
achieved." However, Mrs. Barbato testified that she thought
the doctors began taping her toes and applying padding to the
middle part of her foot at her October 28, 2002, appointment.
She further testified that that day, Dr. Livingston told her
that her complaints might be related to a neuroma, which is
related to scar tissue. Ms. Barbato also testified that she told
the doctor on October 31 st and on November 4th that nothing
had changed that the pain was not getting any better and that
Dr. Livingston recommended an injection on November 4,
2002, but he did not give her one until November 6, 2002.
Mrs. Barbato's medical record of November 6, 2002, reflects
her complaints of pain in the plantar aspect of the third
metatarsal region of her right foot. She was diagnosed with a
"[n]ormal post-op course with bursitis and capsulitis [of her]
3rd MTPJ, right foot." She was treated with a periarticular
injection consisting of 2% Lidocaine and 20 mg of Kenalog
at the third metatarsal of her right foot. Mrs. Barbato testified
that she thought this was the first time the doctor actually
believed that she was in pain and tried to do something about
it. She further testified that she experienced more pain the
night after the injection which, although it got better, got
worse again.
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Mrs. Barbato's continued recovery and healing are reflected
in her medical chart regarding her visit of November 8,2002.
However, she testified at her examination before trial that she
told Dr. Douglas Livingston that the injection had not worked.
She also testified that he compelled her to put on her sneaker
and that she had to use a shoe horn and experienced a lot of
pain. She testified that when she left, she decided that was her
last visit to the Livingston doctors.
Mrs. Barbato sought care from other doctors. Thereafter, Dr.
Alan Canter ordered an MRI on November 22, 2002, which
was "suspicious" for stress fractures involving the shafts of
the second and third metatarsals. MRIs were also performed
on July 8, 2003, and August 21, 2003. Subsequently, Mrs.
Barbato saw Dr. Jonathan T. Deland who had an MRI
performed on April 21, 2006, which indicated scarring
of the first metatarsal joint capsule extending to the first
web space with a small neuroma. On June 30, 2006, Dr.
Deland performed surgery. He performed a right second and
third metatarsal osteotomy, second and third metaphalangeal
release and excision of the Morton's neuroma in the 2nd web
space and a plantar dermodesis of the 2nd toe. On March 29,
2007, he removed the hardware in Mrs. Barbato's right foot.
M In their Bill of Particulars, plaintiffs allege that
defendants failed to use reasonable and proper skill and care
in Mrs. Barbato's treatment; failed to take a full and proper
history; failed to conduct full, appropriate and thorough
physical examinations of Mrs. Barbato when she complained
of brachymetatarsia of the 4th metatarsal of the right foot
and abducted position of the 2nd and 3rd digits in or about
August 2002; failed to properly examine and diagnose the
cause of Mrs. Barbato's severe post-op pain in the plantar
aspect of the 3rd metatarsal phalangeal joint; failed to take,
perform or order timely and adequate diagnostic laboratory
and radiological tests and procedures; failed to give proper
and adequate consideration to the risks, hazards and dangers
inherent in the surgery performed on October 3, 2002; and
failed to warn or advise Mrs. Barbato of the risks, hazards
and dangers inherent in the surgery. Plaintiffs further allege
in their Bill of Particulars that as a result of defendants'
negligence, Mrs. Barbato suffered severe pain in the second
and third digits of the right foot when standing; dull aching
pain in the second and third digits of the right foot when still;
inability to bear weight and walk on her bare right foot; stress
fractures in the right foot; and other sequella from pain and
stress fractures.

"On a motion for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR
3212, the proponent must make a prima facie showing
of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering
sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material
issues of fact." Sheppard-Mobley v. King, 10 AD3d 70,
74 (2d Dept.2004), affd as modified, 4 NY3d 627 (2005),
citing Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324 (1986);
Winegradv. New York Univ. Med Or., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853
(1985). "Failure to make such prima facie showing requires
a denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the
opposing papers." Id. Once the movant's burden is met, the
burden shifts to the opposing party to establish the existence
of a material issue of fact. Alvarez, supra. The evidence
presented by the opponents of summary judgment must be
accepted as true and they must be given the benefit of every
reasonable inference. See, Demishick v. Community Housing
Management Corp., 34 AD3d 518 (2d Dept.2006).
"The requisite elements of proof in a medical malpractice
action are a deviation or departure from accepted practice and
evidence that such departure was a proximate cause of injury
or damage." Ramsay v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 24 AD3d
645, 646 (2d Dept.2005); see also, Thomason v. Orner, 36
AD3d 791 (2d Dept.2007); DiMitri v. Monsouri, 302 A.D.2d
420 (2d Dept.2003); Holbrook v. United Hospital Medical
Center, 248 A.D.2d 358, 359 (2d Dept.1998). "In a medical
malpractice action, the party moving for summary judgment
must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment
as a matter of law by showing the absence of a triable issue
of fact as to whether defendant physician [and/or hospital]
were negligent." Taylor v. Nyack Hospital, 18 AD3d 537 (2d
Dept .2005) citing Alvarez, supra. Thus, a moving defendant
doctor or hospital has "the initial burden of establishing the
absence of any departure from good and accepted medical
malpractice or that the plaintiff was injured thereby." Chance
v. Felder, 33 AD3d 645 (2d Dept.2006) quoting Williams v.
Sahay, 12 AD3d 366, 368 (2d Dept.2004), citing Alvarez,
supra; Johnson v. Queens-Long Is. Med. Group, P.C., 23
AD3d 525, 526 (2d Dept.2005); Taylor, supra; see also,
Thompson v. Orner, supra.
*5 To establish a cause of action for malpractice based
on lack of informed consent, plaintiff must prove (1) that
the person providing the professional treatment failed to
disclose alternatives thereto and failed to inform the patient
of reasonably foreseeable risks associated with the treatment,
and the alternatives, that a reasonable medical practitioner
would have disclosed in the same circumstances, (2) that a
reasonably prudent patient in the same position would not
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have undergone the treatment if he or she had been fully
informed, and (3) that the lack of informed consent is a
proximate cause of the injury." Foote v. Rajadhyax, 268
A.D.2d 745 (3rd Dept.2000), citing Public Health Law §
2805-d (1), (3); lazzetta v. Vicenzi, 200 A.D.2d 209, 213,
appeal dismissed 85 N.Y.2d 857 (1995); Marchione v. State
of New York, 193 A.D.2d 851, 853-854.
Thus, in addition to establishing that a doctor has failed
to adequately inform a patient of the attendant risks and
alternatives, a plaintiff must also establish that the treatment
would not have occurred "but for" the doctor's failure to
properly inform her. That is, "that a reasonably prudent
person in the patient's position would not, if fully informed,
have consented to the treatment." Flores byFlores v. Flushing
Hosp. & Med Ctr, 109 A.D.2d 198 (1st Dept.1985), citing
Dries v. Gregor, 72 A.D.2d 231, 236 (4th Dept.1980);
see also, Faulkner v, Shnayersen, 273 A.D.2d 271 (2d
Dept.2000).
In support of their motion, the Livingston doctors have
submitted an affirmation of Robyn Joseph, D.P.M.,
F.A.C.F.A.S., who is licensed to practice podiatry in
New York. Having reviewed plaintiffs, Deborah Barbato's,
medical records, the Bill of Particulars and the examination
before trial transcripts, Dr. Joseph opines, with a reasonable
degree of podiatric certainty, that all of the treatment provided
to Mrs. Barbato by the Livingston doctors was in accordance
with good and accepted podiatric practice and that the
treatment provided by them did not proximately cause her
injuries. She opines that the Livingston doctors "performed
an adequate examination and took an adequate history from
the plaintiff and ordered appropriate and indicated radiology
based on plaintiffs presentation." (Ex. A.f 13). She states
that Mrs. Barbato's medical record as well as her testimony
document that alternatives and surgical risks were discussed
with her. She also notes that Mrs. Barbato signed a consent
form indicating that her informed consent had been obtained
for the surgery, and that "while the specifics regarding
the Kirschner pin where [sic] not specifically mentioned
in the form or discussed preoperatively, utilizing the Kwire did not add any additional risks that would need to
be disclosed and [that] it is good and acceptable surgical
podiatric practice for a surgeon to use his judgment to
modify surgical decisions intraoperatively." (Id.) Thus, it
is her opinion, within a reasonable degree of podiatric
certainty, that the Livingston doctors adequately disclosed the
risks, alternatives and benefits attendant to the surgery they
performed.

*6 Dr. Joseph further states that it is her opinion, with
a reasonable degree of podiatric certainty, that the surgery
performed on October 3, 2002, was not the proximate cause
of plaintiffs stress fractures, neuroma, or the other injuries
alleged in the Bill of Particulars. She explains that a neuroma
is a thickening of the sheath of the nerve between the
metatarsals head and that it is her opinion that plaintiffs
neuroma was a result ofchronic irritation from hypermobility
of the foot causing the metatarsals to constantly rub on the
nerve with ambulation. It is her opinion that a neuroma
would not develop a few weeks after surgery, especially when
the patient is on crutches and with limited ambulation. She
explains that the Kirschner wire placed by Dr. Livingston was
not placed in the vicinity of the nerve, which is between the
metatarsal heads, but rather was placed in the 3rd metatarsal
head. Dr. Joseph further explains that the tenotomies and
capsulotomies were performed on the dorsal aspect of the
metatarsals and not deep into the interphalanageal space and
that the nerve space was not touched at the time of surgery.
She further opines that there was no undue delay in diagnosis
of Mrs. Barbato's capsulitis/bursitis submetatarsal third digit
by Dr. Livingston. She points out that Dr. Livingston
diagnosed the problem on November 6, 2002, and treated
it appropriately with the cortisone injections. She explains
that the Livingston doctors did not deviate from good and
accepted podiatric practice in failing to diagnose the neuroma
because there were no complaints of pain other than the pain
related to her shortened 4th metatarsal prior to the surgery.
Furthermore, several MRI reports taken subsequent to the
surgery do not demonstrate the presence of a neuroma. In
fact, she notes that the first documentation of a neuroma is
four years after the surgery. Lastly, Dr. Joseph opines that
any suspected stress fractures in the right foot noted on the
MRI would be unrelated to the surgery performed by or the
treatment rendered by the Livingston doctors. He concludes
that assuming the fractures exist which is questionable they
would be related to her congenital condition.
The Livingston doctors have established their entitlement to
summary judgment thereby shifting the burden to plaintiffs to
demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact.
As for defendant hospital, "[a]s a rule, a hospital is normally
protected from tort liability if its staff follows the orders of
the patient's private physician. An exception exists where the
hospital staff knows that the doctor's orders are so clearly
contraindicated by normal practice that ordinary prudence
requires inquiry into the correctness of the orders." Cook
v. Reisner, 295 A.D.2d 466, 467 (2d Dept.2002), quoting
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Warney v. Haddad, 237 A.D.2d 123, 654 N.Y.S.2d 138.
Defendant, New Island Hospital, cannot be held vicariously
liable for plaintiffs private attending physicians' negligence.
Quezada v. O'Reilly-Green, 24 AD3d 744 (2d Dept .2005),
Iv to appeal denied 7 AD3d 703 (2006), citing Orgov an v.
Bloom, 1 AD3d 770 (2004); Evans v. Abitbol, 1 AD3d 313,
314 (2003); O'Regan v. Lundie, 299 A.D.2d 531 (2002).
*7 Furthermore, it was the duty of plaintiffs private
physician, not New Island Hospital, to obtain plaintiffs
informed consent. Sita v. Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med.
Ctr., 22 AD3d 743 (2d Dept.2005) citing Public Health
Law § 2805-d; Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 417
(1967). Case law obligates the physician who proscribed
or performed the procedure to obtain the patient's informed
consent. Spinosa v. Weinstein, 168 A.D.2d 32, 39-40 (2d
Dept. 1991), citing Blank v. Rosenthal 84 A.D.2d 688;
Nisenholtz v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 126 Misc.2d 658 (1984);
Prooth v. Wallsh, 105 Misc.2d 603 (1980); see also,
Domaradzki v. Glen Cove Ob/Gyn Assoc., 242 A.D.2d 282
(2d Dept. 1997). The obligation to procure informed consent
continues only if a degree of participation is retained by
way of control, consultation or otherwise. To extend that
obligation to other medical personnel who have contact
with the patient in connection with her treatment could
deter a patient from procuring needed care on account of
repeated warnings and cautions and intrude on the patientdoctor relationship. Fiorentino v. Wenger, supra, at 415-416;
Spinosa, supra, at 39-40.
Defendant hospital has submitted the affirmation of Leon
Sultan, M.D., a physician licensed to practice in New York
State who is Board Certified in Orthopaedic Surgery in
support of its motion for summary judgment. He, too, has
reviewed Mrs. Barbato's medical records as well as the Bill
of Particulars and examination before trial transcripts. Based
upon his review, he opines, with a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, that the care and treatment rendered to
plaintiff, Deborah Barbato, by the nurses, staff and personnel
of New Island Hospital was at all times within good and
accepted standards of medical care and that the injuries
allegedly suffered by her were not in any way proximately
caused by any of the care and treatment rendered to Mrs.
Barbato by any of the hospital personnel or staff. He notes that
plaintiffs allegations are really levied against the individual
defendant doctors, both pre, post and during the surgery itself.
The Livingston doctors were Mrs. Barbato's private attending
doctors, and there is no evidence that any of the hospital staff
failed to follow their directions or that they followed their

directions when they should not have done so. Furthermore,
defendant hospital did not have an obligation to procure
Mrs. Barbato's consent. "There [is] no evidence presented to
show that the [hospital] knew or should have known that the
plaintiffs private physicians were acting without informed
consent or should have had reason to suspect malpractice."
Cirella v. Central Gen. Hosp., 217 A.D.2d 680, 681 (2d
Dept. 1995), Iv denied, 87 N.Y.2d 801 (1995); see also, Sita,
supra. Defendant hospital has also established its entitlement to
summary judgment, thereby shifting the burden to plaintiffs
to establish the existence of a material issue of fact.
*8 To defeat defendants' motions, "plaintiff[s][are]
obligated to submit competent, rebuttal medical evidence
establishing that defendants deviated from the applicable
standard of care, as well as a causal nexus between their
conduct and her injuries (citations omitted)." Hoffman v.
Pelletier, 6 AD3d 889, 890 (3d Dept.2004).
Plaintiffs maintain that there are indeed triable issues of
fact, to wit: (1) whether defendants failed to obtain Mrs.
Barbato's informed consent more specifically to advise her
of all of her non-surgical options including orthotics and
injections and to apprise her of the possible use of a K-wire
and the potential complications arising therefrom; (2) whether
defendant doctors properly placed the K-wire and took steps
to make sure that it was properly placed; and (3) whether
the hospital reviewed and/or negligently lost her October 3rd
x-ray which, she maintains, constitutes pivotal evidence of
defendant doctors' negligence of which she has now been
deprived.
In support of their opposition, plaintiffs have submitted the
affirmation of Michael Katz, D.P.M., a podiatrist licensed
to practice in New York State, who is board certified in
podiatry. He opines, with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, that the Livingston doctors departed form good
and accepted podiatric practice and that their departures
proximately caused Mrs. Barbato's injuries.
With respect to plaintiffs claim of lack of informed consent,
he states that the Livingston doctors failed to obtain Mrs.
Barbato's informed consent; failed to advise her of other
nonsurgical options; and failed to inform her of the possible
insertion of a K-wire and its possible complications. Dr. Katz
states that it was a departure from good and accepted podiatric
practice to fail to discuss nonsurgical options for her fourth
digit, such as orthotics and injections, with Mrs. Barbato at
her first visit since her toe was not seriously bothering her.
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He similarly states that the Livingston doctors departed from
good and accepted podiatric practice in failing to discuss
nonsurgical options for Mrs. Barbato's hammer toes since she
was not experiencing complications from them and that it
was a departure from podiatric practice to perform surgery on
them.
Dr. Katz further states that it is his opinion that defendants
departed from good and accepted podiatric practice when
operating on Mrs. Barbato; in failing to obtain and preserve
necessary radiological films; and in removing the pin. More
specifically, he cites the absence of the October 3, 2002,
radiological film to confirm that the pin was properly placed
and from there opines that from his "review of the records
and transcripts, it appears that the K-wire was not properly
placed. He further opines that Mrs. Barbato's complaints
about the pin causing her pain should have alerted defendant
doctors to "the possibility" that the K-wire was improperly
placed which could lead to future complications. Dr. Katz
explains that if the K-wire had been properly placed, Mrs.
Barbato should not have had pain. He further explains that
the improper placement of the K-wire can lead to irritation
of the nerve, joint and muscle tissue and cause pain in other
areas on account of a patient's compensatory behavior. This,
he opines, is causally related to a neuroma. He also faults
defendant doctors for removing the pin without anesthesia.
And, he faults defendant doctors for forcing Mrs. Barbato to
put her sneaker on with a shoehorn at her last visit despite her
complaints of pain.
*9 Dr. Katz further opines that defendants' failure to
"properly inform Mrs. BARBATO of the importance of
addressing her short metatarsal prior to the October 3, 2002
surgery was a departure from the standard of podiatric
practice" (f 13) and that their "[fjailure to properly address
the short metatarsal may have lead to a stress fracture and
neuroma." (Id.) He further opines that defendant's failure
to place Mrs. Barbato in an orthotic before and following
surgery, especially in light of her complaints of pain, was a
departure from the standard of podiatric practice which also
may have caused her to develop a stress fracture and neuroma.
As for the hospital, Dr. Katz opines that it departed from
good and accepted medical practice by "failing to take and/or
preserve necessary radiology films to document the position
of Mrs. BARBATO's toes before, during and after the October
3, 2002 surgery." fl| 16) He explains that defendant doctors'
failure to confirm the proper placement of the K-wire is at the
crux of plaintiffs claim and the absence of the films leaves
her at a loss for proof. He further opines that if the K-wire was

improperly placed, it would have been a departure from good
and accepted medical practice by the hospital to not diagnose
it.
As for causation, Dr. Katz simply states:
It is my opinion within a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that Mrs. BARBATO's post operative pain, stress
fracture, neuroma and subsequent surgeries to address her
pain were directly related to the defendants' failure to
obtain informed consent and the improper surgery and the
failure to document, preserve the documents and appreciate
and treat Mrs. BARBATO's complaints and conditions.
But for the above detailed departures, Mrs. BARBATO
would not have had the subsequent unnecessary pain or the
subsequent surgery.fl[20)
As for the Livingstons, while they maintain that they
thoroughly discussed all of Mrs. Barbato's options, which
is reflected in her chart, Mrs. Barbato herself denies this;
and there is no question that the possible use of a pin in
her toe was never discussed. While the Livingstons' expert
concludes that that is routine and that the pin was the result
of the doctors doing what needed to be done when they
discovered the need, plaintiffs' expert adamantly disagrees.
Nevertheless, to establish a claim for lack of informed
consent, plaintiff must establish that "a reasonably prudent
person in the patient's position would not have undergone
the treatment ... if he [or she] had been fully informed and
that the lack of informed consent is a proximate cause of the
injury or condition for which recovery is sought." Manning v.
Brookhaven Mem'l Hosp. Med Ctr., 11 AD3d 518, 520 (2d
Dept.2004). Conspicuously absent from plaintiffs' opposition
is any allegation or evidence that the result would have been
any different had she been made fully aware of her choices
and the possible use of a pin. This glaring omission is fatal to
her claim. See, Manning, supra.
*I0 As for the surgery, the October 8th x-ray establishes
that the pin was properly positioned, and plaintiffs have
failed to show why it is not conclusive in that regard.
All of plaintiffs' allegations regarding the misplacement of
the pin are speculative. Indeed, numerous times plaintiffs'
expert notes that the pin may have been improperly placed.
Plaintiffs' expert's surmise that the wire's placement may
have caused her neuroma also fails. The wire was not
placed where the neuroma developed. More importantly, the
neuroma did not show up until four years later despite MRIs
done repeatedly in the interim, and glaringly absent from
plaintiffs' evidence is any explanation as to how this could
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have happened. As for plaintiffs' expert's assertion that the
removal of the pin without anesthesia was improper, no
damages have been established. As for the "possible" stress
fractures, not only have they not been firmly established, they
have not been conclusively linked to the doctors' care.
As for defendant hospital, plaintiffs have also failed to meet
their burden. A hospital is not vicariously liable for the acts of
a private attending doctor retained by a patient and is immune
from liability where its employees have not committed
independent acts of negligence and have only followed the
attending doctor's instructions, unless that doctor's orders are
so clearly contraindicated that normal prudence would require
that inquiry be made regarding the doctor's orders. Toth v.
Bloshinsky, 39 AD3d 848, 850 (2d Dept.2007); see also,
Sita, supra. The only negligent act allegedly attributable to
defendant hospital is its failure to preserve the x-rays which
were taken after Mrs. Barbato's surgery, which, plaintiffs
allege, cripples their attempt to prove that the pin was not
properly surgically positioned. However, again, it is not
disputed that x-rays taken only a few days after Mrs. Barbato's
surgery, i.e., October 8th, establish that the pin was properly
positioned. Moreover, there is not a scintilla of evidence
which indicates that anything happened to Mrs. Barbato's foot
between the time of her surgery and when these x-rays were
taken which could have changed the position of the pin. There
was no surgery or trauma to her foot in those intervening days.
As for plaintiffs' application to strike defendant hospital's
answer, this "court has broad discretion in determining
what, if any, sanction should be imposed for spoliation
of evidence." lannucci v. Rose, 8 AD3d 437, 438 (2d
Dept.2004), citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kearns, 309 A.D.2d776
End of Document

(2003). "It may, under appropriate circumstances, impose a
sanction even if the destruction occurred through negligence
rather than wilfulness, and even if the evidence was destroyed
before the spoliator became a party, provided [the party] ...
was on notice that the evidence might be needed for future
litigation.' " lannucci, supra, quoting DiDomenico v. C &
S Aeromatik Supplies, 252 A.D.2d 41, 53 (1998). However,
"striking a pleading is a drastic sanction to impose in the
absence of willful or contumacious conduct, [and] courts will
consider the prejudice that resulted from the spoliation to
determine whether such drastic relief is necessary as a matter
of fundamental fairness." lannucci, supra, citing Favish v.
Tepler, 294 A.D.2d 396 (2d Dept.2002). "A less severe
sanction is appropriate where the missing evidence does not
deprive the moving party of the ability to establish his or her
defense or case." lannucci, supra, quoting Chiu Ping Chung
v. Caravan Coach Co., 285 A.D.2d 621 (2001); Klein v. Ford
Motor Co., 303 A.D.2d 376 (2003).
* / / Suffice it to say, not only is there no evidence
of willful or contumacious conduct by defendant hospital,
the missing x-rays are of no consequence. See, Wetzler v.
Sisters of Charity, 17 AD3d 1088 (4th Dept.2005). Indeed,
conspicuously absent from plaintiffs' expert's affirmation is
any discussion of the October 8th x-rays which display the
proper placement of the pin.
This decision constitutes the order of the court.
Parallel Citations
18 Misc.3d 1123(A), 2008 WL 269627 (N.Y.Sup.), 2008
N.Y. Slip Op. 50188(U)
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Rhonda S. BRYANT, and husband,
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David H. MCCORD, M.D., David H. McCord,
d/b/a Tennessee Spine Center, Inc., AcroMed
Corporation, AcroMed, Inc., and Columbia/
HCA Healthcare Corporation, Defendants,
and
HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc., d/b/a
Centennial Medical Center, Defendant/Appellee.
No. 01A01-9801-CV-00046. Jan. 12,
1999. Application of Rhonda S. Bryant
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HCA Health Services Denied, June 14,1999.
From the Circuit Court of Davidson County at Nashville,
Honorable Walter C. Kurtz, Judge.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Charles J. Williams, John B. Carlson, Williams & Associates,
P.C., Nashville, Tennessee, G. Thomas Nebel, Law Offices
Of Tom Nebel, P.C., Nashville, Tennessee, Attorneys for
Plaintiffs/Appellants.
CJ. Gideon, Jr., William S. Walton, Gideon & Wiseman,
Nashville, Tennessee, Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees.
Opinion
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED
IN PART AND REMANDED
FARMER.
*./ PlaintiffRhonda Bryant appeals an order ofthe trial court
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Centennial
Medical Center (CMC). We find, contrary to the ruling of
the trial court, that there is a genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether CMC violated a duty of care owed to
Bryant. Thus, we reverse the portion ofthe trial court's order

granting summary judgment to CMC with respect to Bryant's
hospital malpractice claim. For reasons somewhat different
than those cited by the trial court, we agree that the trial court
properly granted summary judgment to CMC with respect to
Bryant's remaining claims.

Factual and Procedural History
Bryant sustained back injuries as a result of her involvement
of two separate automobile accidents occurring in 1979 and
1992. Following the second accident, Bryant was examined
by Dr. Steven McLaughlin. Dr. McLaughlin diagnosed
Bryant's condition as kyphosis, a condition commonly known
as curvature of the spine, and referred Bryant to Dr. David
McCord, an orthopaedic surgeon.
Dr. McCord recommended that Bryant undergo surgery to
correct her curvature ofthe spine. According to Bryant, Dr.
McCord did not guarantee the results ofthe proposed surgery
but did state that there was a high likelihood that the surgery
would be a success and that Bryant could be as good as
new and back to work within six months after the procedure.
He further explained, however, that if the surgery was not a
success, Bryant would have to undergo a second and more
extensive surgical procedure. On May 3, 1993, Dr. McCord
performed a surgical procedure on Bryant which involved
the implantation of pedicle screws in Bryant's spine. After
this first surgery, Bryant's back pain worsened. Six months
after the surgery, Bryant was still unable to return to work.
Nine months after the surgery, Bryant continued to take pain
medication prescribed by Dr. McCord. On February 21,1994,
Bryant underwent a second surgery during which Dr. McCord
replaced the pedicle screws implanted during the first surgery
and inserted a "bone cage" in Bryant's spine.
Bryant continued to experience severe pain and take
prescription pain medication following this second surgery.
Bryant consulted Dr. John Campa regarding further treatment
for her continuing pain. While in the waiting room of Dr.
Campa's office, Bryant met a woman who informed her
that several lawsuits had been filed against Dr. McCord
in connection with his use of pedicle screws. Bryant made
arrangements to meet with the attorneys who represented the
plaintiffs in the other lawsuits against Dr. McCord. Bryant
also sought a second opinion from Dr. John Ditmer regarding
her injuries. In June of 1997, Bryant underwent a third surgery
to correct her back injuries. This procedure, which was
performed by Dr. Michael McNamara, involved the removal
of the hardware implanted in Bryant's spine by Dr. McCord
and its replacement with other corrective hardware.
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On March 18, 1996, Bryant filed an action against a variety
of defendants including Centennial Medical Center (CMC),
the facility where Dr. McCord performed the May 1993 and
February 1994 surgeries. During the same week that Bryant
filed her complaint, approximately sixty identical lawsuits
were filed by Bryant's attorneys on behalf of other individual
plaintiffs. All of the cases were assigned to a single trial judge
who selected twelve of the cases (including the action brought
by Bryant) to proceed with discovery.
*2 On May 6, 1997, CMC filed a motion for summary
judgment with respect to all of Bryant's claims against CMC.
On October 17, 1997, while CMC's motion for summary
judgment was still pending, a Pennsylvania federal court
approved a settlement agreement in a multiple district lawsuit
against AcroMed, the manufacturer of the devices implanted
in Bryant's spine during the May 1993 and the February 1994
surgeries. See Fanning v. AcroMed Corp. (In re Orthopedic
Bone Screw Prods. Liability Litigation), 176 F.R.D. 158
(E.D.Penn.1997). By memorandum opinion dated October
30, 1997, the trial court granted CMC's motion for summary
judgment. Bryant filed a motion to alter or amend the ruling
which was denied by the trial court. Bryant has appealed the
trial court's ruling with respect to her claims based on lack of
informed consent, hospital malpractice, joint enterprise, and
acting in concert.

Issues
The issues on appeal as we perceive them are as follows: (1)
Are any or all of Bryant's claims against CMC barred by the
AcroMed settlement agreement? (2) Are any or all of Bryant's
claims against CMC barred by the statute of limitations?
(3) Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in
favor of CMC with respect to Bryant's claims against CMC
based on lack of informed consent, hospital malpractice, joint
enterprise, and/or acting in concert?

Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the party seeking
summary judgment demonstrates that there are no genuine
issues of material fact and further shows that, under the
undisputed facts, the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. See White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W.2d
525, 528 (Tenn.l998)(citing Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208,
210 (Tenn.1993)). When ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and
discarding all countervailing evidence. See id. at 529 (citing
Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 210-11). If there is a dispute as to any
material fact or any doubt as to the conclusion to be drawn
from the evidence, the motion must be denied. See Dooley
v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn.App.l990)(citing
Phillips v. Pittsburg Consol Coal Co., 541 S.W.2d 411,413
(Term. 1976)). Because this is solely a legal determination, our
review of the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary
judgment is de novo with no presumption of correctness. See
White, 975 S.W.2d at 528-29 (citing Robinson v. Omer, 952
S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn.1997); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d
618, 622 (Tenn. 1997)).

AcroMed Settlement Agreement
*3 In December of 1996, a settlement agreement was
reached in a lawsuit pending against AcroMed in a
Pennsylvania federal court. The Pennsylvania district court
issued an opinion approving this agreement on October 17,
1997. See Fanning v. AcroMed Corp. (In re Orthopedic
Bone Screw Prods. Liability Litigation), 176 F.R.D. 158
(E.D.Penn.1997). In its memorandum opinion of October 30,
1997, the trial court in the instant case did not discuss the
existence of this settlement agreement. On appeal, however,
CMC contends that the agreement provides an additional
basis for the dismissal of Bryant's claims against CMC.
Thus, although the trial court did not rely upon the AcroMed
settlement agreement when granting CMC's motion for
summary judgment, we nevertheless address whether the
agreement has any legal effect on Bryant's claims.
The AcroMed settlement agreement provides in pertinent part
as follows:
This Agreement shall be the exclusive remedy for any and
all Settled Claims of Settlement Class Members and for
any claims of Settlement Class Members against AcroMed
and the Released Parties arising out of the subject matter
of this Agreement and the Complaint. AcroMed and the
Released Parties shall not be subject to liability or expense
of any kind to any Settlement Class Member with respect
to any Settled Claim or for any claim arising out of the
subject matter of this Agreement, except as provided in this
Agreement. When the Final Order and Judgment becomes
Final, each of the Settlement Class Members shall be
barred from initiating, asserting, or prosecuting any Settled
Claims.
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In determining whether this provision operates to bar Bryant's
claims against CMC, we must first determine whether Bryant
qualifies as a member of the settlement class. The AcroMed
agreement defines the term "Settlement Class" as follows:
"Settlement Class" shall mean all persons and entities
wherever located, who have or may in the future have
any claim (whether filed or unfiled, existing or contingent,
and specifically including claims for alleged injuries and
damages not yet known or manifest), ... in any state or
federal courts of the United States or the courts of its
territories or possessions, against any or all of AcroMed
and the Released Parties arising out of, based upon,
related to, or involving Orthopedic Bone Screws that
were implanted in the United States or its territories or
possessions in an operation that occurred on or before
December 31, 1996...
The agreement defines the term "Orthopedic Bone Screw" as
follows:
"Orthopedic Bone Screw" shall mean any screw, including
but not limited to bone screws, cancellous bone screws,
universal cancellous bone screws, sacral screws, iliac
screws, and pedicle screws, and/or related devices used
with such screws as adjuncts to spinal fusion surgery,
including but not limited to plates, rods, hooks, wires,
cables, connectors, nails, clamps, washers, nuts, ramps,
cages, and implants of any kind.
*4 In the instant case, Bryant filed a claim in state court
against AcroMed and other defendants. This claim is directly
related to the implantation of pedicle screws and a bone cage
in her spine prior to December 31, 1996. Thus, we conclude
that Bryant is a member of the settlement class affected by
the AcroMed agreement.
We next consider whether CMC is among the defendants
affected by the AcroMed settlement agreement. The
agreement states that its purpose is to "settle and resolve ...
all Orthopedic Bone Screw Related claims against AcroMed
and the Released Parties." The terms and conditions of the
agreement specifically require the dismissal of claims against
AcroMed, the released parties, and the professional societies.
The terms "released parties" and "professional societies" are
defined as follows:
"Released Party/Parties" shall mean and shall be limited
to those persons and entities listed on Exhibit E to this
Agreement.

"Professional Societies" shall mean the American
Academy of Neurological Surgeons ("AANS"), American
Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons ("AAOS"), North
American Spine Society ("NASS"), and Scoliosis
Research Society ("SRS").
CMC is not included among the parties listed in Exhibit
E of the settlement agreement. It is also not one of
the organizations named in the definition of the term
"Professional Societies." Thus, the express language of the
purpose statement contained in the AcroMed settlement
agreement supports the conclusion that the agreement was not
intended to settle claims brought against CMC.
CMC contends that, in addition to claims against AcroMed,
the released parties, and the professional societies, the
settlement agreement also operates to bar claims against nonsettling defendants. The term "Non-Settling Defendant" is
defined as follows:
"Non-Settling Defendant" shall mean any person or entity
that is not AcroMed or a Released Party as defined herein
but that is named as a defendant in any pending or future
action or litigation alleging injury or damage as a result of
the implantation of any Orthopedic Bone Screw.
We agree that CMC qualifies as a non-settling defendant
within the meaning of this definition.
We conclude, however, that the AcroMed settlement
agreement does not provide for the dismissal of claims
against non-settling defendants. Rather, the agreement serves
to enjoin non-settling defendants from maintaining an action
for contribution, indemnity, or subrogation against AcroMed
or the released parties. The agreement requires class members
to deposit into the settlement fund any money received from
non-settling defendants and provides that such proceeds shall
not be disbursed until the claims against the non-settling
defendant are either dismissed with prejudice or until the
non-settling defendant releases any third party claims that
it may have against AcroMed and/or the released parties.
Additionally, it authorizes the administrator of the settlement
fund to consider the extent to which non-AcroMed bone
screw recipients have been compensated by non-settling
defendants when deciding whether to make funds available
to this class of plaintiffs. Finally, the agreement states that
judgments obtained against non-settling defendants shall be
reduced by any amount that the non-settling party is entitled
to recover from AcroMed or the released parties. Thus, the
language of the AcroMed settlement agreement contemplates
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that members of the settlement class might obtain judgments
against defendants such as CMC that did not participate in the
settlement.
*5 Accordingly, we find that the AcroMed settlement
agreement releases any settled claims that Bryant may have
against AcroMed, the released parties, and the professional
societies but does not require the dismissal of Bryant's claims
against any non-settling defendant, including CMC.

Statute of Limitations
At trial, CMC argued that all of Bryant's claims against CMC
were barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court found
that, with the exception of Bryant's claim that CMC did not
inform her that she might experience pain, discomfort, and
abnormal sensations and that her pain level might worsen
after the 1993 surgery, Bryant's claims are not barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. CMC does not challenge
this ruling on appeal. Bryant, however, contends that the trial
court erred in finding that her pain related lack of informed
consent claims are untimely.
Causes of action based on lack of informed consent are
subject to the same limitations period as medical malpractice
claims. See Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 733
(Tenn.1998). The statute of limitations applicable to medical
malpractice claims states in pertinent part as follows:
(1) The statute of limitations in malpractice actions shall be
one (1) year as set forth in § 28-3-104.
(2) In the event the alleged injury is not discovered within
the said one (1) year period, the period of limitation shall
be one (1) year from the date of such discovery.
Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a) (1980). The two surgeries
that Dr. McCord performed on Bryant at CMC took place
on May 3, 1993 and February 21, 1994. Bryant did not file
her complaint against CMC until March 18, 1996. Thus,
CMC contends that Bryant's claims arising out of these two
surgeries are untimely.
In considering whether Bryant's lack of informed consent
claims related to pain experienced after the May 1993
surgery are barred by the statute of limitations, we must first
determine the date on which Bryant discovered her injuries.
In Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn.1998), Shadrick
underwent a surgical procedure on March 12, 1990 involving
the implantation of pedicle screws. See id. at 728. After the
surgery, Shadrick's pain worsened and in September of 1990,

an X-ray revealed that one of the screws had broken. See id. at
729. In November of 1990, the pedicle screws were surgically
removed from Shadrick's back. See id. Shadrick continued
to experience pain even after the screws were removed. See
id. Dr. Coker, Shadrick's surgeon, did not attribute Shadrick's
continued pain to the use of pedicle screws. See id. Rather,
he explained that this pain might be due to inflammation or
scarring and also expressed his belief that Shadrick had a low
tolerance for pain. See id. On December 17, 1993, Shadrick
viewed a television program reporting that pedicle screws
were experimental, had not been approved for use in the spine,
and had caused a number of problems in patients in whom
they had been implanted. See id.
*6 On December 16, 1994, Shadrick filed an action against
Dr. Coker and CMC, the facility where his surgeries were
performed, alleging that he had not been informed of the
risks associated with the use of pedicle screws prior to
the surgery. See id. Dr. Coker and CMC filed identical
motions for summary judgment, claiming that Shadrick's
claims were barred by the one year statute of limitations
applicable to medical malpractice claims. See id. at 730. The
trial court granted the motion to dismiss. See id. On appeal,
the Tennessee Supreme Court noted as follows:
[T]he statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff
knows or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence
should know that an injury has been sustained as a result
of wrongful or tortious conduct by the defendant.... "It is
knowledge of facts sufficient to put a plaintiff on notice that
an injury has been sustained which is crucial." Stanbury,
at 678. Such knowledge includes not only an awareness of
the injury, but also the tortious origin or wrongful nature
of that injury.
Id. at 733-34 (quoting Stanbury v. Bacardi 953 S.W.2d
671, 677 (Tenn.1997); Roe v. Jefferson, 875 S.W.2d 653,
657-58 (Tenn. 1994); Hathaway v. Tennessee Anesthesiology,
P.C., 724 S.W.2d 355, 359 (Tenn.App.1986)). The court
then concluded that, because he had been told that the use
of pedicle screws was a "routine treatment" and because
Shadrick's surgeon offered other explanations for Shadrick's
continued pain, there was evidence from which a jury could
find that Shadrick did not discover his cause of action until
December of 1993. See id. at 734. Thus, the court held that
there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding when the
statute of limitations began to run. See id. at 735.
In the present case, Bryant experienced back pain prior to her
referral to Dr. McCord. Her pain worsened, however, after she
underwent surgery in May of 1993. Bryant stated that it never
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occurred to her after the May 1993 surgery that she might
have a cause of action because Dr. McCord had explained
that, if the May 1993 surgery was unsuccessful, Bryant
may have to undergo a second surgical procedure. Like the
plaintiff in Shadrick, Bryant also viewed a television program
regarding the dangers of pedicle screws. Bryant became
concerned and discussed the program with Dr. McCord
during her next visit. Dr. McCord reassured Bryant that the
screws used during her surgery were different from and of
a higher qualify than the ones discussed on the television
program.
Applying the holding in Shadrick to the case at bar, we must
conclude that, because Dr. McCord allegedly attempted to
persuade Bryant that the screws implanted in her spine were
not the cause of her continuing pain, there is a genuine issue of
material fact regarding when Bryant should have reasonably
known that the pain she experienced after the May 1993
surgery was the result of the screws used by Dr. McCord.
While Bryant was certainly aware of her pain immediately
following the May 1993 surgery, a jury could reasonably
conclude that she was not aware of the tortious origin of
her pain until sometime thereafter. Thus, we hold that the
trial court erred in finding that Bryant's lack of informed
consent claims relating to pain experienced after the May
1993 surgery are barred by the statute of limitations.

Lack of Informed Consent
*7 Bryant contends that CMC failed to obtain her informed
consent prior to the performance of the May 1993 and
February 1994 surgeries. CMC, however, argues that it had
no legal duty to obtain Bryant's informed consent.
Bryant filed with the trial court affidavits from three
physicians concluding that CMC had a duty to obtain Bryant's
informed consent prior to each of the surgical procedures
performed on Bryant. Expert testimony, however, should not
be considered when determining whether a defendant owes a
legal duty to a plaintiff. See Coffey v. Knoxville, 866 S.W.2d
516, 519 (Tenn.1993). Rather, the existence or nonexistence
of a duty is entirely a question of law to be determined by
the court. See, e.g., Blair v. Campbell, 924 S.W.2d 75, 78
(Tenn.1996). Thus, in determining whether CMC had a duty
to obtain Bryant's informed consent, we will disregard the
legal conclusions contained in the affidavits of Bryant's expert
witnesses.
It is well established in Tennessee that a physician has a duty
to obtain the informed consent of his or her patient before

administering a treatment or performing a surgical procedure
on the patient. See, e.g., Shadrick, 963 S.W.2d at 732 (citing
Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 750 (Tenn.1987)).
The law in Tennessee is silent, however, regarding whether
the hospital where the treatment is administered or the
surgical procedure is performed also has a duty to obtain
the patient's informed consent. Other jurisdictions that have
considered this question have repeatedly held that hospitals
generally do not have a duty to obtain the patient's informed
consent. Krane v. Saint Anthony Hosp. Sys., 738 P.2d 75, 77
(Colo.Ct.App.l987);Pe/ne//c> v. Kalman, 215 Conn. 377,576
A.2d 474,478 (Conn. 1990); Valcin v. Public Health Trust of
Dade County, A13 So.2d 1297, 1307 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1.984),
approved in part and quashed in part on other grounds,
507 So.2d 596 (Fla.1987); Parr v. Palmyra Park Hosp., 139
Ga.App. 457, 228 S.E.2d 596, 597-98 (Ga.Ct.App.1976);
Pickle v. Curns, 106 Hl.App.3d 734, 62 Ill.Dec. 79, 435
N.E.2d 877, 880-81 (IU.App.Ct. 1982); Auler v. Van Natta,
686 N.E.2d 172, 175 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997); Pauscher v. Iowa
Methodist Medical Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 362 (Iowa 1987);
Lincoln v. Gupta, 142 Mich.App. 615, 370 N.W.2d 312,
318 (Mich.Ct.App.1985); Baltzell v. Baptist Medical Ctr.,
718 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Mo.Ct.App.1986); Giese v. Stice,
252 Neb. 913, 567 N.W.2d 156, 164 (Neb. 1997); Johnson
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 113 N.M. 736, 832 P.2d 797,
800 (N.M.Ct.App.1992); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d
407, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373, 227 N.E.2d 296, 301 (N.Y.1967);
Cox v. Haworth, 54 N.C.App. 328, 283 S.E.2d 392, 395-96
(N.C.Ct.App.1981); Kershaw v. Reichert, 445 N.W.2d 16,
17 (N.D.I989); Goss v. Oklahoma Blood Inst., 856 P.2d
998,1007 (Okla.Ct. App.l 990); Kelly v. Methodist Hosp., 444
Pa.Super. 427, 664 A.2d 148, 150 (Pa.Super.Ct.1995); Ritter
v. Delaney, 790 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex.Ct.App.1990); Howell v.
Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 114 Wash.2d 42, 785
P.2d 815, 822-23 (Wash. 1990); Cross v. Trapp, 170 W.Va.
459, 294 S.E.2d 446, 459 (W.Va. 1982). The underlying
rationale of these decisions has been stated as follows:
*8 It is the surgeon, and not the hospital, who has the
technical knowledge and training necessary to advise each
patient of the risks of the surgery prior to the patient
giving his consent. Further, the hospital does not know the
patient's medical history, nor the details of the particular
surgery to be performed.
Krane, 738 P.2d at 77. Additionally, one court commented
that "[t]o impose upon a hospital the duty to inform would
be to require a hospital to intervene into the physician/patient
relationship" and concluded that this result would be "more
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disruptive than beneficial to [the] patient." Goss, 856 P.2d at
1007 (quoting Howell 785 P.2d at 822).
We agree that the duty to obtain a patient's informed
consent prior to the performance of a surgical procedure lies
exclusively with the patient's physician. Thus, there is no duty
on the part of the hospital to give the patient information, to
ensure that the patient understands any information received
from other sources, such as the patient's physician, or to
obtain the patient's consent prior to the scheduled procedure.
Similarly, we do not think that the hospital has a duty
to ensure that the patient's physician has carried out his
or her duty to obtain the patient's informed consent. We
agree with the court in Goss that such a rule would require
hospitals to unnecessarily interfere with the physician/patient
relationship. See id
At least one jurisdiction has recognized a limited exception
to the general rule that the law does not impose on a hospital
a duty to obtain informed consent from its patients. In
Friter v. Iolab Corp., 414 Pa.Super. 622, 607 A.2d 1111
(Pa.Super.Ct.1992), the plaintiff underwent cataract surgery
involving the implantation of a type of lens that had not been
approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) and that was the subject of a clinical study designed
to test its safety. See id. at 1111. FDA regulations required
hospitals participating in the study to obtain informed consent
from any patient undergoing this experimental treatment.
See id. The plaintiff brought an action against the hospital,
alleging that he was not informed prior to the surgery that he
was a participant in the study or that the experimental lens
would be implanted in his eye during the surgery. See id. at
1111-1112. While noting the general rule that hospitals do
not have an independent duty to obtain informed consent, the
court found that, by participating in an experiment that was
subject to the FDA regulations, the hospital assumed a duty
to obtain the patient's informed consent. See id. at 1115.
In Corrigan v. Methodist Hosp., 158 F.R.D. 70
(E.D.Pa.1994), the plaintiff underwent back surgery
involving the implantation of devices similar to those
implanted in the instant case. See id. at 71-72. The plaintiff
asserted a claim against the hospital where the procedure w as
performed, alleging that the hospital knew that his surgery
was performed as part of an informal clinical study, that the
FDA had restricted the sale of these devices to approved
institutions, and that the hospital was not one of those
institutions. See id. at 73. The plaintiff argued that, under such
facts, Fritter imposed on the hospital an independent duty to
obtain his informed consent. See id. The court found that the

plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to maintain a cause of
action against the hospital for lack of informed consent and
thus held that the trial court should have denied the hospital's
motion for judgment on the pleadings. See id.
*9 In the instant case, Bryant alleges that CMC failed to
inform her (1) that pedicle screws were not approved by the
FDA for use in spine surgery, (2) that pedicle screws were
classified by the FDA as experimental or investigational,
and (3) that there were medical problems and other risks
associated with the use of pedicle screws. She does not
allege, however, that the devices used by Dr. McCord were
implanted in her spine as part of a clinical study. We think
that the duty imposed by Friter and Corrigan is limited to
situations in which the hospital, by virtue of its participation
in a clinical study, is subject to FDA regulations and applies
only when the patient is actually a subject in the study. In the
case at bar, it is undisputed that Bryant was not involved in
any FDA regulated study. Thus, we conclude as a matter of
law that CMC had no duty to obtain her informed consent.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in
granting CMC's motion for summary judgment with respect
to Bryant's informed consent claim.

Hospital Malpractice
The trial court also granted summary judgment in favor of
CMC with respect to Bryant's hospital malpractice claim. On
appeal, Bryant contends that CMC (1) failed to verify that
Bryant had given her informed consent and permitted the use
of a misleading and inaccurate consent form, (2) failed to
monitor and control the use of investigational devices used in
surgeries performed at CMC, and (3) failed to enforce policies
governing the obtaining of informed consent. Bryant's first
and third allegations are related to her claim against CMC
based on lack of informed consent. In addressing this claim,
we held that the duty to obtain a patient's informed consent
lies with the patient's physician, not with the hospital where
the procedure is performed. Similarly, we held that there
is no duty on the part of the hospital to ensure that the
physician has obtained the patient's informed consent prior
to the performance of the scheduled procedure. Thus, we
consider only whether the trial court erred in finding that there
are no genuine issues of material fact and that CMC is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law regarding Bryant's claim that
CMC violated a duty owed to her in failing to monitor the
use of investigational devices used in surgeries performed at
CMC.
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Bryant asserts the position that her hospital malpractice
claim is predicated on the doctrine of corporate negligence.
The doctrine of corporate negligence imposes liability on a
hospital for the breach of a duty of care owed by the hospital
directly to the patient. See, e.g., Clark v. Perry, 114 N.C.App.
297, 442 S.E.2d 57, 65 (N.C.Ct.App.1994). Under this legal
theory, hospitals owe to patients four types of duties. These
duties include as follows:
(1) a duty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe
and adequate facilities and equipment; (2) a duty to select
and retain only competent physicians; (3) a duty to oversee
all persons who practice medicine within its walls as to
patient care; and (4) a duty to formulate, adopt and enforce
adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for the
patients.
*10 Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 527 Pa. 330, 591 A.2d 703,
707 (Penn.l991)(internal citations omitted). The doctrine
of corporate negligence has been recognized by at least
seventeen jurisdictions outside of Tennessee. See Tucson
Medical Or., Inc. v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d
958, 960 (Ariz. 1976); Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132
Cal.App.3d 332, 183 Cal.Rptr. 156, 157 (Cal.Ct.App.1982);
Kitto v. Gilbert, 39 Colo.App. 374, 570 P.2d 544, 550
(Colo.Ct.App.1977); Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So.2d 209, 214
(Fla.1989); Mitchell County Hosp. Auth v. Joiner, 229 Ga.
140, 189 S.E.2d 412, 414 (Ga.1972); Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hosp., 33 I11.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
253, 258 (111.1965); Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 64 Mich.App.
685, 236 N.W.2d 543, 550 (Mich.Ct.App.1975); Gridley
v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475, 484-85 (Mo. 1972); Foley v.
Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 185 Neb. 89, 173 N.W.2d
881, 884 (Neb.1970); Corletov. Shore Memorial Hosp., 138
N.J.Super. 302, 350 A.2d 534, 537-38 (N.J.Super. Ct. Law
Div.1975); Raschel v. Rish, 110 A.D.2d 1067, 488 N.Y.S.2d
923, 925 (N.Y.App.Div.1985); Blanton v. Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp., Inc., 319 N.C. 372, 354 S.E.2d 455, 457-58
(N.C.1987); Benedict v. St. Luke's Hosps., 365 N.W.2d
499, 504 (N.D.1985); Park N. Gen. Hosp. v. Hickman, 703
S.W.2d 262, 266 (Tex.Ct.App.1985); Pedroza v. Bryant,
101 Wash.2d 226, 677 P.2d 166, 170 (Wash. 1984); Utter v.
United Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 160 W.Va. 703, 236 S.E.2d 213, 215
(W.Va. 1977); Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 99
Wis.2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156, 164 (Wis.1981).
The courts of Tennessee have long recognized that hospitals
have a legal duty to exercise reasonable care toward their
patients. See O'Quin v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 184 Term.

570, 201 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tenn.1947); Keeton v. Maury
County Hosp., 713 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tenn.App.1986).
In Crumley v. Memorial Hosp., Inc., 509 F.Supp. 531
(E.D.Tenn.1979), affdmem., 647 F.2d 164 (6th Cir.1981),
a federal court considered whether, under Tennessee law, a
hospital could be held independently liable for the negligence
of one of its anesthesiologists. The Crumley court recognized
that a hospital has a duty to use due care in the selection and
retention of physicians practicing within its facility. See id. at
535. InPrincev. Coffee County, Tennessee, No. 01A01-9508CV-00342, 1996 WL 221863 (Tenn.App. May 3, 1996),
the plaintiff sustained injuries resulting from improperly
administered anesthetic during out-patient surgery. See id.
at * 1. The plaintiff filed a claim against the hospital where
the procedure was performed, alleging that it negligently
failed to establish and enforce adequate anesthetic policies
and procedures. See id. We reversed an order of the trial court
granting summary judgment in favor of the hospital, finding
that there were genuine issues of material fact precluding
summary judgment. See id. at *5. In Keeton v. Maury County
Hosp., 713 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn.App. 1986), the seventy-nine
year old plaintiff repeatedly called for a nurse to assist him
in getting to the restroom. See id. at 315. Because no one
appeared to assist him, the plaintiff attempted to go to the
restroom alone, lost his balance, and fell to the floor. See
id. at 316. We held in Keeton that, in failing to assist the
plaintiff, the hospital did not exercise reasonable care toward
the plaintiff. See id. at 318. Finally, in Spivey v. St. Thomas
Hosp., 31 Tenn.App. 12, 211 S.W.2d450 (Tenn.App. 1947),
a delirious patient fell out of the window of his third floor
hospital room. See id. at 451. We held that the hospital had a
duty to prevent a patient in a delirious condition from getting
out of bed and harming himself. See id. at 454.
*// Bryant urges us to expressly adopt the doctrine of
corporate negligence. We find this to be unnecessary because
we believe that it is already the law of this state that hospitals
have a duty to use reasonable care to maintain their facilities
and equipment in a safe condition, to select and retain only
competent physicians, to supervise the care given to patients
by hospital personnel, and to adopt and enforce rules and
policies designed to ensure that patients receive quality care.
As part of its duty to supervise the care given to patients,
we think that a hospital must exercise at least a limited
amount of control over the use of devices that are considered
to be investigational. In opposition to CMC's motion for
summary judgment, Bryant relies in part upon the affidavits
of three physicians stating that the devices implanted in
her spine at CMC were investigational. Additionally, Bryant
relies upon a letter written by Dr. Robert Alford, CMC's
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Medical Director, suggesting that the use of pedicle screws in
spine fixation surgery should be regarded as investigational
Finally, Bryant notes that CMC's institutional review board
discussed Dr. Alford's letter and concluded that this usage
of bone screws should be employed under "investigational
protocol." CMC, however, denies that the devices implanted
in Bryant's spine were investigational. On the contrary, CMC
alleges that these types of devices have been widely used in
the medical community for many years. Whether a medical
device is investigational is not a question that may be resolved
on a motion for summary judgment but instead must be
determined by the trier of fact after consideration of all of
the evidence. We thus find that, in the instant case, the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
CMC with respect to Bryant's hospital malpractice claim. On
remand, the trier of fact must determine whether the devices
implanted in Bryant's spine were investigational. If the trier of
fact concludes that the devices were, in fact, investigational,
it must then determine whether CMC violated its duty to
monitor and control the use of these devices in its facilities.

Joint Enterprise
Bryant also seeks to recover from CMC under the theory
of joint enterprise. Bryant essentially claims that CMC was
engaged in a joint venture with Dr. McCord, the purpose of
which was to raise revenue by performing as many surgical
procedures as possible at CMC. A joint venture is similar to
a partnership and thus is subject to the same rules of law that
apply to partnerships. See, e.g., Federated Stores Realty, Inc.
v. Huddleston, 852 S.W.2d 206, 212 (Tenn.1992). The law of
Tennessee imposes joint and several liability on members of
a partnership for the tortious acts committed by any partner in
furtherance of the partnership. See In re Sikes, 184 B.R. 742,
747 (M.D.Tenn. 1995).
In order to establish that CMC and Dr. McCord were
engaged in a joint venture, Bryant must show (1) that they
shared a common purpose, (2) that there was an agreement
between them, and (3) that they each had an equal right
"to control both the venture as a whole and any relevant
instrumentality." Fain v. O'Connell, 909 S.W.2d 790, 793
(Tenn.l995)(quoting Cecil v. Hardin, 575 S.W.2d 268,
271 (Term.1978)). The imposition of liability based on the
existence of a joint venture is reserved for "cases in which
the parties associate for business, or expense sharing, or some
comparable arrangement." Id. (quoting Cecil, 575 S.W.2d at
272).

*12 In the instant case, Bryant has alleged that CMC funded
the hiring of a program coordinator who worked with CMC's
marketing director to promote the services provided by Dr.
McCord and that CMC guaranteed a base salary to two
members of Dr. McCord's staff. Bryant contends that, from
these facts, a jury could conclude that CMC and Dr. McCord
shared a common purpose and had reached an agreement
regarding that purpose. We agree that these facts alleged by
Bryant are sufficient to create a jury question with respect to
these first two elements of a claim based on the theory ofjoint
enterprise.
With respect to the third element of a joint venture,
Bryant alleges that CMC instituted certain policies regarding
the performance of surgeries at CMC, including a policy
restricting surgeons from performing more than two back
surgeries and one neck surgery per day. Bryant further
alleges, however, that Dr. McCord sometimes violated this
policy by scheduling three or four back surgeries in a single
day and that CMC would allow Dr. McCord to do "whatever
he wanted." Assuming the truth of these allegations, as we
must for purposes of summary judgment, we cannot conclude
that CMC and Dr. McCord shared equal control over their
business relationship. On the contrary, it appears that Dr.
McCord acted independently of CMC with respect to the care
of his patients, ignoring the attempts of CMC to regulate the
number of procedures that he performed per day. We thus find
that Bryant has failed to state a claim against CMC under the
theory of joint enterprise. Accordingly, we hold that the trial
court properly granted CMC's motion for summary judgment
regarding this claim.

Acting in Concert
Finally, Bryant contends that CMC is subject to liability for
her injuries under a concert of action theory. The courts of
this state have recognized that "when two or more persons
engage in an unlawful act and one of them commits a serious
civil injury upon a person not engaged therein, all are equally
liable for damages to the injured party." Huckeby v. Spangler,
521 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tenn.1975). The elements of a claim
based on a concert of action theory include as follows:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious
conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant
to a common design with him, or
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(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gave substantial assistance or encouragement to
the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in
accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct,
separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to third
person.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(c). Bryant contends
that by failing to supervise Dr. McCord and by allowing
Dr. McCord to use its facilities when performing surgical
procedures, CMC substantially assisted Dr. McCord in
breaching his duty of care owed to Bryant. We disagree. The
acts alleged by Bryant, even if proven to be true, would not
constitute substantial assistance on the part of CMC. Thus,
we conclude that Bryant has failed to state a claim under the
theory of concert of action. Accordingly, we hold that the trial
court properly granted CMC's motion for summary judgment
with respect to this claim.

Conclusion

*13 For the foregoing reasons, we find (1) that the AcroMed
settlement agreement does not require the dismissal of any
of Bryant's claims against CMC, (2) that none of Bryant's
claims against CMC are barred by the statute of limitations,
(3) that the trial court properly granted CMC's motion for
summary judgment with respect to Bryant's claims based on
lack of informed consent, (4) that the trial court erred in
granting CMC's motion for summary judgment with respect
to Bryant's claims based on hospital malpractice, (5) that
the trial court properly granted CMC's motion for summary
judgment with respect to Bryant's joint enterprise claim, and
(6) that the trial court properly granted CMC's motion for
summary judgment with respect to Bryant's acting in concert
claim.
We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the
trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cost of appeal are charged one-half to Bryant and one-half to
CMC, for which execution may issue if necessary.

CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S. and TOMLIN, Sp. J. concur.

Footnotes
1
Bryant's complaint alleged a number of theories for recovery, including negligence, strict liability, failure to warn, negligent
misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of implied warranty, breach of express warranty, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, fear of future illness and/or product failure, negligent infliction of emotional distress, violation of the Tennessee
Consumer Protection Act, supply of a product dangerous for its intended use, doctor's medical malpractice, hospital's medical
malpractice, battery, lack of informed consent, conspiracy, joint enterprise, negligence per se, and action in concert. On appeal we
consider only Bryant's claims based on lack of informed consent, hospital malpractice, joint enterprise, and acting in concert.
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge.
*/ Appellant D.N.N., on behalf of her minor son H.A.N.,
brought a medical-malpractice claim against respondents
Unity Hospital and Allina Health System. Appellant's claim
is the result of a circumcision procedure performed on
H.A.N, by Steven Joseph Berestka, M.D. at Unity Hospital.
Before trial, respondents moved for summary judgment,
and appellant moved for partial summary judgment and to
amend the complaint to add a punitive-damages claim. The
district court denied appellant's motions and granted summary
judgment to respondents.
Appellant argues that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment to respondents. Appellant asserts that the

district court erred because (1) under a traditional negligence
claim, respondents had a legal duty to protect H.A.N, from
the harm caused by Dr. Berestka; (2) respondents' violation
of federal Medicare law establishes a prima facie case of
negligence per se; and (3) appellant's complaint should be
amended to include punitive damages. We affirm.

FACTS
Appellant is the mother of male child H.A.N. Appellant and
H. A.N.'s father have another son who was born before H.A.N.
Appellant and H.A.N.'s father agreed that it was up to the
father to decide if their first son would be circumcised. He
chose to have their first son circumcised. During a prenatal
visit while appellant was pregnant with H.A.N., appellant
completed a form regarding her circumcision preference.
The form asked, "If you have a boy, would you like him
circumcised?" Appellant circled a " Y" for yes, assuming that
H.A.N.'s father would want the baby to be circumcised like
their other son.
H.A.N, was born on January 21, 2000, at respondent Unity
Hospital. Unity Hospital is part of a group of hospitals
run by respondent Allina Health System. Dr. Berestka was
the obstetrician on call at Unity Hospital after H.A.N.'s
birth. Dr. Berestka approached a nurse employed by Unity
Hospital and asked if there were any circumcisions to be
performed. The nurse informed Dr. Berestka that there was
one child to be circumcised and then prepared H.A.N, for
the procedure. Dr. Berestka did not consult with appellant or
H.A.N ,'s father before performing the circumcision. After the
circumcision, appellant and H.A.N.'s father were dissatisfied
by the appearance of H.A.N.'s penis. As a result, appellant
sought advice from another physician, who subsequently
performed a revision for cosmetic purposes.
At the time that H.A.N.'s circumcision was performed,
Unity Hospital had a patient-care policy in place that
required physicians to obtain informed consent for all surgical
procedures that modified a patient's body. The policy also
required written verification of informed consent. But in
March 1999, prior to H.A.N.'s birth, the hospital amended its
patient-care policy to exempt circumcisions from the written
verification requirement.
Following H.A.N.'s circumcision, appellant filed a complaint
with the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) regarding
the failure to obtain informed consent prior to the procedure.
MDH conducted an investigation and issued a public report
on May 24, 2001, concluding that respondents were not

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

D.N.N, v. Berestka, Not Reported in N.W.2d (2008)

in compliance with Medicare conditions of participation
concerning informed-consent forms and procedures. The
MDH found multiple deficient practices, including a failure
"to assure the presence of properly executed informed consent
forms for surgical procedures."
*2 Appellant subsequently filed her claim in district
court, alleging assault and battery and negligence against
Dr. Berestka and improper credentialing and violation of
Minn.Stat. §§ 325F.68-.70 (2006), commonly known as
the consumer-fraud act, against respondents. Respondents
and appellant moved for summary judgment, and appellant
moved to amend the complaint to add punitive damages.
The district court granted respondents' motions for summaiy
judgment. The district court stated that, although appellant's
claim against Unity Hospital and Allina was labeled
"improper credentialing," it was a claim of traditional
negligence based on Unity Hospital's alleged duty to verify
that Dr. Berestka had obtained informed consent. The district
court concluded that the hospital had no duty to ensure that
Dr. Berestka had obtained informed consent. The district
court also granted respondents' summary-judgment motion
on appellant's claim based on the consumer-fraud act, on the
grounds that appellant failed to (1) plead that count with the
specificity required by Minn. R. Civ. P. 9 .02; (2) establish
that Unity Hospital had been deceptive or misleading in its
revision of the policy that eliminated the requirement of
written verification of informed consent for circumcisions;
and (3) demonstrate that prevailing on her claim would
benefit the public. This appeal follows.

DECISION
On an appeal from summary judgment, this court asks
two things: (1) whether there are any genuine issues of
material fact and (2) whether the district court erred in its
conclusions of law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d
2,4 (Minn. 1990).
It is the duty of the physician, not the hospital, to ensure that
a patient gives informed consent for a surgical procedure.
See Femrite v. Abbott Nw. Hosp., 568 N.W.2d 535, 543
(Minn.App.1997) ("Generally a physician has the duty to
ensure that a patient gives informed consent."), review denied
(Minn. Nov. 18, 1997). The district court also cited a "North
Dakota Supreme Court decision that discussed the issue of a
hospital's duty to obtain informed consent. In Long v. Jasczak,
688N.W.2d 173,181 (N.D.2004), the North Dakota Supreme
Court concluded that "[t]he duty to obtain informed consent
is solely the responsibility of the physician, not the hospital

where the procedure is performed." As support for its holding,
the North Dakota Supreme Court relied on the majority rule
that states that even where a policy exists regarding informed
consent, it does not create a legal duty to obtain informed
consent. Long, 688 N.W.2d at 181 (citing Mele v. Sherman
Hosp., 838 F.2d 923, 925 (7th Cir.1988); Porter v. Sisters
of St. Mary, 756 F.2d 669, 673 (8th Cir.1985); Petriello v.
Kalman, 215 Conn. 377, 386, 576 A.2d 474, 479 (1990);
Wilson v. Lockwood, 711 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Mo.App.1986)).
We agree that the majority rule cited by the district court is
the appropriate legal standard. The duty to obtain informed
consent is a nondelegable duty placed solely on the treating
physician as the person in the best position to advise the
patient of the risks and benefits of the surgical procedure. See,
e.g., Femrite, 568 N.W.2d at 543; Long, 688 N.W.2d at 181.
Appellant suggests that expert testimony in this case creates a
duty or a factual question that precludes summary judgment.
But without a legal duty, expert statements of a deviation
from a professional standard of care cannot give rise to a
claim of negligence. Servicemaster of St. Cloud v. GAB Bus.
Servs. Inc., 544 N.W.2d 302, 307 (Minn. 1996). Even when
a standard of care is breached, if there is no legal duty, there
can be no claim for negligence. Id. ("A [medical professional]
will not be bound to conform its conduct to a standard of care
unless a legally recognized duty exists.").
*3 Appellant also suggests that respondents owed a duty to
protect H .A.N. from harm caused by third parties and cites
Tomfohrv. Mayo Found, 450N.W.2d 121,124 (Minn. 1990),
and Sylvester v. Nw. Hosp. of Minneapolis, 236 Minn. 384,
386-87, 53 N.W.2d 17, 19 (1952), for this proposition. But
these cases do not support appellant's contention. Both cases
involved hospitals with mentally ill patients and injuries
caused by those patients. See Tomfohr, 450 N.W.2d at 125
(holding that a medical provider has a duty to prevent
self-injurious conduct); Sylvester, 236 Minn, at 386-87, 53
N.W.2d at 19 (holding that a hospital that knows or should
know of a patient's dangerous tendencies has a duty to protect
others from the patient's dangerousness). Here, the injury
complained of was one caused by a medical provider, not a
third-party patient known to be dangerous.
Appellant also claimed that Unity Hospital and Allina
violated the consumer-fraud act, Minn.Stat. §§ 325F.68-.70
(2006). Appellant's claim is based on an allegation that
respondents engaged in deceptive practices in the hospital's
revision of its policy that eliminated the requirement for
verification of written informed consent for a circumcision.
Appellant did not brief this claim, which ordinarily results in
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duty that has been breached. But appellant did not raise
this issue in the district court. Appellant may have properly
pleaded a claim of negligence, but negligence per se is a
distinct claim. See Kronzer v. First Nat'l Bank, 305 Minn.
415,428,235 N.W.2d 187,195 (1975) (actual negligence and
negligence per se are treated as separate claims). An appellate
court may not consider a "question never litigated below."
Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency, 728 N.W.2d 510, 522
(Minn.2007) (quoting Thiele v. Stick, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582
(Minn. 1988)). Because appellant did not properly raise this
issue in the district court, we decline to consider it at this time.

waiver. Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982).
Nevertheless, we will address its merits.
As the district court noted, the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure require that consumer fraud be pleaded with
particularity. Minn. R. Civ. P. 9.02. Here, appellant failed
to provide a basis in her complaint for any deceptive or
misleading actions on the part of respondents. Appellant
suggests that Unity Hospital's revision of its informedconsent policy, exempting circumcisions, is a deceptive
practice but fails to identify how it is so. Further, appellant
has not established how prevailing on her claims would
benefit the public-a requirement for a private citizen using the
consumer-fraud act. Seelyv. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314
(Minn.2000).

Finally, appellant challenges the district court's denial of her
motion to amend the complaint to add a claim of punitive
damages against respondents. But because we conclude that
the district court correctly granted summary judgment to
respondents, we do not reach that issue.

Appellant also raises an issue of negligence per se on appeal.
Appellant asserts that respondents have violated federal
Medicare regulations and that the violation creates a separate

*4 Affirmed.

Footnotes
1
Although originally included in appellant's claims, Dr. Be
longer a party to this case.
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BOREN, P.J.

INTRODUCTION
*/ This appeal of a medical malpractice case involves the
requirement that an expert witness establish that a healthcare
provider's recommendation or rendering of medical care fell
below the standard of care. It also involves the validity of
the patient's informed consent when there is a signed consent
form. Finally, it addresses which persons or entities have
a duty to obtain the patient's informed consent. We find
that respondent Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (Cedars) was
entitled to summary adjudication as to all causes of action
and that there was no prejudicial error in granting summary
judgment as to respondent Frances Lineback, M.D. (Dr.
Lineback).

FACTS
1. Presurgery Medical History
At the time of surgery, appellant was a 46-year-old woman
who had undergone two ectopic pregnancies more than 18
years prior. For over a year, appellant experienced irregular
menses with heavier than normal bleeding, which became
constant during the final three months before surgery. Bruce
McLucas, M.D., diagnosed appellant with fibroid tumors
three months prior to surgery. His records show he explained
the risks and benefits of undergoing a hysterectomy, and
appellant elected not to undergo the procedure at that
time. Arthur Johnson, M.D. (Dr. Johnson), later counseled
appellant in the outpatient department of Cedars, where
she elected to undergo the hysterectomy. At that time, Dr.
Johnson was an independent physician with privileges to
utilize the hospital facilities.
2. Surgery
Appellant was admitted to Cedars on May 6, 2003, where
she signed a surgery consent form recognizing that training
physicians and nurses may take part in her surgery. Dr.
Johnson, assisted by resident Dr. Lineback, performed a
total abdominal hysterectomy on appellant. The surgery was
complicated because the doctors had to break up extensive
abdominal adhesions and remove a large fibroid before the
actual hysterectomy could be performed. The doctors did not
close the inner abdominal wall at the conclusion of surgery.
Dr. Lineback assisted in surgery primarily by holding and
suturing but stated she probably did perform a portion of the
hysterectomy. Approximately eight months after the surgery,
Dr. Johnson took an early retirement after being diagnosed
with primary progressive aphasia, a disease which slowed his
motor skills and made him incapable of performing surgery.
3. Postsurgery Complications
Appellant experienced postoperative bowel obstruction due
to the combination of adhesions resulting from the surgery
and preexisting adhesions which may have reformed
during surgery. Surgeon Kenneth Adashek, M.D., consulted
appellant a week after her surgery. As a result of the blockage,
appellant began to vomit, which necessitated the pumping of
appellant's stomach from the time of consultation until Dr.
Adashek performed corrective surgery seven days later. Dr.
Adashek initially attempted to correct the bowel obstruction
using nonsurgical decompression, but he eventually had to
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perform two surgeries, removing approximately 12 inches of
appellant's intestine, which had been cut off from a blood
supply, to correct the obstruction. There was no evidence the
intestine had been cut during the hysterectomy.

Appellant dismissed her counsel and substituted herself in
propria persona. During discovery, appellant learned that
Dr. Lineback was the assisting doctor in her surgery and
thus amended the complaint to include Dr. Lineback as a
defendant in place of Doe 1.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2. Motion for Summary Judgment
1. Complaint
*2 Appellant, in propria persona, filed a complaint
in Los Angeles Superior Court on August 6, 2004,
against Dr. Johnson as an individual and corporation,
Cedars, and unknown employees of Cedars. The complaint
alleged medical negligence, professional negligence, lack
of informed consent, contributory negligence, and fraud.
Appellant sought compensatory damages, exemplary
damages, and punitive damages. The proceedings against Dr.
Johnson as an individual and corporation were stayed as the
parties entered into binding arbitration. Neither is a party to
this appeal.
Cedars demurred on the grounds that causes of action for
lack of informed consent, contributory negligence, and fraud
failed to state a cause of action, and the causes of action
for compensatory and exemplary damages failed to state
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Cedars also
made a motion to strike the portions of appellant's complaint
relating to punitive and exemplary damages and attorney fees
on the grounds that they violated Code of Civil Procedure
sections 425.13 and 1021. The court sustained the demurrer
and motion to strike but granted appellant leave to amend the
complaint within 30 days.
Appellant retained counsel, who submitted the first amended
complaint alleging medical malpractice against all original
defendants. The amended complaint asserted an Elam claim
against Cedars for negligence in allowing Dr. Johnson to
perform appellant's surgery while he was suffering from
a debilitating condition. It also asserted negligence for
"failure to properly test and evaluate whether plaintiff was
a proper candidate for the prescribed course of medical
care and/or surgery, failure to obtain appropriate consent
prior to and during the conduction of the prescribed course
of medical/nursing care and/or surgery, failure to follow
the prescribed course of medical care and/or surgery when
appropriate, failure to correctly administer medications, and
failure to diagnose and properly treat plaintiff as her condition
warranted."

Cedars filed a motion for summary judgment on April 7,
2005, supported by the declarations of Amy Rosenman, M.D.
(Dr. Rosenman), that the surgical care and treatment of
appellant was appropriate and not the proximate cause of her
injuries, and Linda Leon, R.N. (Nurse Leon), that the nursing
care and treatment was appropriate.
In her declaration, Dr. Rosenman asserted the
recommendation of the hysterectomy was within the standard
of care, given appellant's abnormal bleeding and the presence
of fibroid tumors. She described the procedures involved
in conducting a hysterectomy and found that the standard
of care was met at all times during appellant's surgery. Dr.
Rosenman explained that appellant's injuries were the result
of the accepted risks and complications of the procedure
and they did not imply negligence. She found there was no
evidence that appellant's intestines had been injured during
the hysterectomy. Finally, Dr. Rosenman was of the opinion
that Cedars had no duty to inform appellant of the risks of
the surgery because it is not the hospital's function to obtain
informed consent.
*5 Nurse Leon asserted in her declaration that appellant
made no complaints of bruising or soreness in her skin during
her stay at the hospital. She further asserted that any potential
bruising or scarring from nurse-administered injections were
accepted risks and complications of the injections and did not
indicate that the injections were performed below the standard
of care.
Based on these declarations and appellant's lack of an expert
opinion to create an issue of material fact, Cedars moved
for summary judgment. Cedars claimed Dr. Rosenman's
declaration established that the recommendation, care and
treatment were within the standard of care. Cedars asserted
that this removed any causation linking Dr. Johnson's medical
condition and appellant's injuries necessary to establish
negligent medical treatment, which is required for an Elam
claim. Cedars further asserted that the hospital had no duty
to obtain informed consent. Finally., Cedars claimed the
declaration of Nurse Leon established the nursing care and
treatment were within the standard of care.
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3. Opposition and Ruling
DISCUSSION
The motion for summary judgment was initially scheduled to
be heard on June 24, 2005, but appellant was granted three
separate continuances to file an opposition. In granting the
final continuance, the court clearly told appellant that there
would be no further continuances if she failed to produce an
expert's opinion regarding the standard of care. The hearing
was eventually held on November 9, 2005.
Appellant filed an amended opposition to the summary
judgment motion on October 26, 2005, supported by the
expert opinion of Simon Henderson, M.D. (Dr. Henderson).
The amended opposition alleged that Dr. Johnson negligently
recommended appellant undergo the surgery, that Cedars
should not have allowed Dr. Johnson to perform surgery
in Dr. Johnson's condition or allowed Dr. Lineback to
assist, that Dr. Rosenman based her opinions on flawed
information, and that appellant did not give informed consent
to the hysterectomy or to having Dr. Lineback assist in the
operation.
The amended opposition also included the declaration of
appellant's expert, Dr. Henderson, stating that he disagreed
with and would not have made the recommendation to
undergo the hysterectomy, feeling it was not necessary and
not worth the risk. Dr. Henderson further declared that
he saw no evidence Dr. Johnson had informed appellant
of the potential risks and complications of undergoing a
hysterectomy.
Cedars argued in its reply that the declaration of appellant's
expert did not create a material issue of fact regarding
negligent treatment, that appellant signed a form consenting
to Dr. Lineback's involvement in the surgery, that Dr.
Lineback had no duty to obtain appellant's informed consent
because she was not the recommending physician, and finally
that appellant was advised ofthe risks ofthe hysterectomy by
Dr. McLucas and thus she was adequately informed.
On November 9, 2005, the court ruled that Dr. Henderson's
declaration did not address the requisite standard of care and
thus there was no triable issue of fact. The court rejected
appellant's request for another continuance to amend her
expert's declaration and granted the motion for summary
judgment as to Cedars. The court also granted summary
judgment as to Dr. Lineback, although she was not a named
party to the motion.

I. Applicable Principles of Appellate Review
*4 We review de novo the trial court's decision to grant
summary judgment, and "consider all ofthe evidence set forth
in the papers, except that to which objections have been made
and sustained by the court, and all [uncontradicted] inferences
reasonably deducible from the evidence...." (Code Civ. Proa,
§ 437c, subd .(c).) We view such evidence and inferences
in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co . (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) The
defendant moving for summary adjudication on any cause
of action need only show that the plaintiff cannot establish
one necessary element ofthe cause of action, then the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show a triable issue of fact with
respect to that element ofthe cause of action. (Id. at p. 853.)
This burden cannot be met by conclusory or argumentative
opposition based on mere conjecture or speculation. (Joseph
E. DiLoreto, Inc. v. O'Neill (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 149, 161.)
Appellant sets forth a long list of issues, but we may
consider only those issues raised by the amended complaint.
(Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Turlock (1985) 170
Cal.App.3d 988, 994.) Further, we are confined to consider
only those relevant issues that have been adequately raised
and supported in appellant's brief. (Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65
Cal.App.4th 452,466.) "To the extent defendant perfunctorily
asserts other claims, without development and, indeed,
without a clear indication that they are intended to be discrete
contentions, they are not properly made, and are rejected on
that basis." (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 214 fo.
19.) Thus, we consider the granting of summary adjudication
regarding the causes of action for negligent recommendation
of the hysterectomy, for negligent care and treatment, for
an Elam claim, for negligent supervision, and for failure to
obtain informed consent. We also review the trial court's
refusal to grant appellant's request for a continuance, the
effect of the court's ruling on demurrer in relation to the
motion for summary judgment, and the appropriateness of
summary judgment as to Dr. Lineback, who was not a named
party to the motion.
II. The Effect ofthe Court's Ruling on Demurrer
Appellant argues that the court's ruling on demurrer shows
there might be a triable issue of fact regarding an Elam
claim and should have precluded granting summary judgment
to Cedars. In ruling on a demurrer, the court accepts the
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allegations of the complaint as being true. {Frank and
Freedus v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 461,
475.) In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the
court requires declarations or affidavits to establish a triable
issue of material fact, rather than relying on assertions that
such evidence exists or on conclusory statements based on
speculation or conjecture. (Ibid.) A higher standard must be
met to overcome a motion for summary judgment. For this
reason, a ruling that a complaint survives a demurrer in no
way precludes a grant of summary judgment regarding the
same issue.
III. The Court's Refusal to Grant a Continuance
*5 Appellant did not comply with Code of Civil Procedure
section 437c, subdivision (h), requiring that a request for
mandatory continuance be made in opposition to the motion
for summary judgment or by ex parte application made
on or before the opposition is due. Since appellant did
not comply with the statute, the court's refusal to grant
appellant's oral request for continuance was discretionary and
is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. (Mahoney
v. Southland Mental Health Associates Medical Group (1990)
223 Cal.App.3d 167, 170.)
In this case, the court had previously granted three
continuances, spanning more than four months, to allow
appellant time to oppose the motion for summary judgment.
In granting the last continuance the court explicitly explained
to appellant what was required to overcome summary
judgment and that no more continuances would be granted
if appellant failed to produce it. The court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to grant a fourth continuance.
IV. Care and Treatment
Expert testimony must establish the appropriate standard
of care in a medical malpractice cause of action, except
in narrow circumstances where the conduct falls within
common knowledge. (Flowers v. Torrance Memorial
Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 1001.) This
is because the standard of care against which a physician's
conduct is measured is beyond the knowledge of an average
juror and particularly within the knowledge of an expert.
(Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 606-607.)
" 'When a defendant moves for summary judgment and
supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct
fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled
to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward
with conflicting expert evidence.' (Hutchinson v. United
States (9th Cir.1988) 838 F.2d 390, 392, citing Willard v.

Hagemeister (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 406, 412.)" (Munro v.
Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d
977, 985.)
Cedars moved for summary judgment supported by the
expert declarations of Dr. Rosenman and Nurse Leon. Dr.
Rosenman detailed the surgical procedure and concluded that
Cedars's performance met the standard of care at all times.
Nurse Leon concluded the nursing care met the standard of
care, including the administration of the injections. Appellant
failed to provide any conflicting expert testimony that the
performance of the surgery or medical care and treatment
failed to meet the standard of care. Thus appellant failed to
create a triable issue of material fact and Cedars was entitled
to summary adjudication as to the medical malpractice cause
of action against it for the care and treatment rendered to
appellant.
V. Recommendation of the Hysterectomy
Cedars moved for summary judgment supported by Dr.
Rosenman's expert declaration. Dr. Rosenman reviewed
appellant's medical record and concluded that Dr. Johnson's
decision to recommend the hysterectomy was within the
standard of care, given appellant's abnormal bleeding and
the presence of fibroid tumors. Appellant produced Dr.
Henderson's expert testimony concluding that based on
appellant's medical record she should not have undergone the
hysterectomy until less invasive procedures had been tried.
Dr. Henderson stated that he would not have recommended
the hysterectomy and did not feel it was necessary at that time,
but he did not conclude that Dr. Johnson's recommendation
fell below the standard of care. Exhibit D attached to
appellant's opening brief consists of an amended declaration
by Dr. Henderson that recommending the hysterectomy fell
below the standard of care, but this declaration was created
subsequent to entry of the judgment and cannot be considered
because it is not a part of the trial court record.
*6 Appellant relies on Tortorella v. Castro (2006) 140
Cal.App.4th 1, to argue that recommending an unnecessary
surgery is inherently below the standard of care. Tortorella is
readily distinguished because that court concluded only that
an expert's opinion that a surgery was unnecessary, where
the performing surgeon allegedly misdiagnosed the patient's
condition, was sufficient to create a triable issue of fact about
causation. (Id. at p. 3.) The plaintiffs expert witness in that
case stated that the recommendation fell below the standard
of care, which was the basis for finding a triable issue of
fact concerning a breach of duty. Appellant is still required
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to produce an expert to create a triable issue of fact regarding
any alleged breach of the standard of care.
It is clear that Dr. Rosenman and Dr. Henderson had a
difference of opinion about Dr. Johnson's recommendation of
a hysterectomy against less invasive alternatives. However, a
difference of medical opinion about the appropriate procedure
to prescribe, given several alternatives, does not establish
that the decision to recommend one constitutes negligence.
{Clemens v. Regents of University of California (1970) 8
Cal.App.3d 1, 13.) Rather, a viable cause of action for
medical negligence requires expert testimony establishing the
standard of care. (Willamson v. Prida (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th
1417, 1424.) Appellant failed to produce conflicting expert
evidence as to whether the recommendation to undergo the
hysterectomy fell within or below the standard of care. Thus,
Cedars was entitled to summary adjudication as to the medical
malpractice cause of action against it for the recommendation
of the hysterectomy.
VI. Elam Claim
The court in Elam held that a hospital could be liable to a
patient under the doctrine of corporate negligence for the
negligent conduct of independent physicians and surgeons
who are not hospital employees but are members of the
hospital staff. {Elam, supra, 132 Cal.App.3d 332, 335.)
The hospital's liability stems from its "failure to insure the
competence of its medical staff through careful selection and
review," creating unreasonable risk of harm to the patient.
(Id. at p. 341.) To prevail on an Elam claim, a plaintiff must
show that the hospital was negligent in allowing a physician
or surgeon to be a member of its staff. As prerequisite to
this, the plaintiff must show that the physician or surgeon
himself was negligent in his conduct, otherwise there could
be no causation linking the patient's injuries to the hospital's
negligent supervision.
As discussed above, appellant has failed to show that
Dr. Johnson's recommendation or performance of the
hysterectomy fell below the standard of care. As a result,
appellant has failed to show any negligent conduct on the
part Dr. Johnson. Thus, appellant cannot prevail on an Elam
claim. Regardless of whether the hospital was negligent in
allowing Dr. Johnson to remain on its staff, he performed the
surgery within the standard of care and thus there is no causal
link between who performed the surgery and any resulting
complications. Accordingly, Cedars was entitled to summary
adjudication as to the Elam cause of action against it.

VII. Informed Consent
A. Validity of Appellant's Consent to Dr. Lineback's
Participation in Surgery
*7 Appellant contends she never consented to and in fact
was never made aware that Dr. Lineback would be assisting
in performing her surgery. She claims she would never
have consented to allowing a resident to do so. However,
appellant completely fails to address the consent form she
signed upon admittance to the hospital, acknowledging that
Cedars was a teaching hospital and that "physicians ... in
training may participate in the operation ... specified above
under the supervising physician or surgeon named above" and
consenting thereto.
Appellant relies on Quintanilla v. Dunkelman (2005) 133
Cal.App.4th 95, to argue that the validity of a written consent
form signed by the patient is a question of fact for the jury
and thus summary judgment is improper. The court there
concluded, "The law is clear in California that the existence
of informed consent is an issue of fact for the jury" and that
"the adequacy of a written consent is a factual issue for the
jury, and does not stand for the proposition that a signed form
is conclusive proof that informed consent was given." {Id.
at pp. 115-116.) However, in that case there was significant
conflicting evidence that the consent form was written in
Spanish, which the plaintiff contended she did not understand,
and the performing surgeon, who she had never met, went
outside the scope of the procedures authorized by the consent
form. {Id. at pp. 117-118.) In this case, appellant presents no
conflicting evidence except her own assertion that she did not
consent to Dr. Lineback's participation, with no reference or
explanation as to why her signed consent was invalid.
More importantly, the court in Quintanilla addressed the
validity of the informed consent to medical procedures, an
issue particularly well suited to a jury because the duty of
disclosure of the risks and complications of the procedure is
not governed by the community standard of care but by law
that governs the physician's conduct in the same way as for
any other fiduciary relationship. {Berkey v. Anderson {1969) 1
Cal.App.3d 790, 805.) It is a peculiarly fact-based question as
to the breadth and depth to which a physician should explain
the risks and complications of a procedure that is particular
to the individual patient. (Ibid.)
This is an entirely different issue than the type of consent
appellant is contesting in this case. Here, we are assessing
the validity of a signed, written consent to the participation
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of training physicians and nurses in surgery performed on
a nonemergency basis. None of the same particularities to
each individual patient are present. The ability of a hospital to
rely on a written consent form to allow physicians and nurses
in training to participate in surgery under the supervision of
senior physicians and surgeons is a crucial element in the
proper training of physicians and nurses.
Nonemergency consent to participation in surgery is
better addressed as courts have addressed physician-patient
arbitration agreements, where a patient will be bound by his
signed consent in the absence of evidence that he did not
understand what he was signing or that he signed the form
to receive urgent medical care. (See Bolanos v. Khalatian
(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1586, 1590-1591; Coon v. Nicola
(1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1238.) Appellant signed the
form consenting to Dr. Lineback's participation in the surgery
as a physician in training. She signed the form under a
nonemergency basis and presented no evidence that she did
not understand the form. She was bound by her written
consent, and Cedars was entitled to summary adjudication
as to the cause of action for failure to obtain consent to Dr.
Lineback's participation in surgery.
B. Dr. Lineback's Duty to Obtain Informed Consent
*8 Appellant contends Dr. Lineback had an independent
duty to obtain informed consent based on her participation
in the surgery. The seminal case on the doctrine of informed
consent in California is Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d
229, which established that the treating physician had a
duty of reasonable disclosure of the available choices for
treatment and the risks and complications associated with
each. {Id. at p. 243.) In explaining the reasoning for such
a duty, the court explained that "[a] medical doctor, being
the expert, appreciates the risks inherent in the procedure
he is prescribing, the risks of a decision not to undergo the
treatment, and the probability of successful outcome of the
treatment." {Ibid.) The court emphasized that the duty to
disclose fell on the prescribing physician, at which point the
choice as to the course of action fell exclusively on the patient.
{Ibid.) The duty is derived from the being in the position to
prescribe the treatment.
In Quintanilla v. Dunkelman, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th 95,
the court expanded this duty to include both the referring
physician and the treating and performing surgeon, where the
patient had never met the surgeon and reasonably believed
the referring physician would be performing the surgery.
{Id. at pp. 118-119.) The court in Wilson v. Merritt (2006)

142 Cal.App.4th 1125, concluded that the duty fell on the
original prescribing physician and the performing physical
therapist, where the physician administered the anesthesia
and the patient reasonably believed the physician would be
in charge throughout the procedure. {Id. at pp. 1136-1137.)
Importantly, the duty to obtain informed consent rests
only with those physicians who have actively managed the
patient's care. {Id. at p. 1134.)
No case has imposed a duty on assisting surgeons to obtain
informed consent from the patient. An assisting surgeon is
not in the same position to inform the patient of relevant
information at the time of prescribing the treatment. An
assisting surgeon is generally not actively involved in
managing the patient's care. Rather, an assisting surgeon is
generally a member of the hospital staff who works under the
supervision of the performing surgeon as needed, with little
or no prior contact with the patient to establish a physicianpatient relationship. There is no public policy furthered by
requiring each hospital employee assisting in the care for a
patient to obtain informed consent. This is especially true in
this case, where the assisting surgeon is a resident in training.
The duty to obtain informed consent should remain with
the prescribing and treating physician. As such, Dr. Johnson
had the duty to obtain appellant's informed consent as the
physician who prescribed and performed the surgery. Dr.
Lineback had no such duty as a resident, assisting primarily
in holding and suturing.
C. Duty of Cedars to Obtain Informed Consent
Appellant contends Cedars had a duty to obtain her informed
consent to the hysterectomy because it was performed at the
hospital. California courts have yet to specifically address
the issue. As discussed earlier, it is clear that the court: in
Cobbs v. Grant, supra, 8 Cal.3d 229, was focusing on the duty
of the treating physician to disseminate relevant information
to the patient and to gain her informed consent prior to
conducting the surgery. {Id. at p. 243.) This duty was based
on the fiduciary relationship the treating doctor shared with
the patient and the disparity in medical knowledge between
the doctor and patient. {Ibid.) A hospital does not share this
same fiduciary relationship with the patient. Further, hospital
staff members do not necessarily have the same level of expert
knowledge regarding the factors to be considered in choosing
to undergo treatment, nor are they in the position at the time
of prescribing treatment to disseminate the information.
*9 In Derrick v. Ontario Community Hospital (1975) 47
Cal.App.3d 145, the court recognized that placing a duty
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on the hospital could disrupt the relationship between the
treating physician and the patient. {Id. at p. 154.) The court
in that case was considering whether the hospital had a duty
to inform the patient or her parent that she had a contagious
disease. The court found the duty fell exclusively with the
treating physician, explaining its reasoning: "We do not think
it wise to impose upon Hospital the duty to advise a patient
or a patient's parents concerning the patient's condition when
that duty might substantially interfere with the relationship
between the patient and her attending physician." {Ibid.) The
impact on the physician-patient relationship is likely to be
even more drastic if a duty to obtain informed consent to
treatment were imposed on the hospital. It could disrupt the
physician's ability to recommend and render the treatment
which the physician feels is best suited to the situation.
While it is not the case for general surgical procedures, the
California Legislature has specifically addressed the issue
of consent to performing a hysterectomy. Health and Safety
Code section 1690 lays out the specific information which
must be given to the patient both orally and in writing before
undergoing the surgery. The statute requires that, "Prior to
the performance of a hysterectomy, physicians and surgeons
shall obtain verbal and written informed consent." (Health &
Saf.Code, § 1690, subd. (a).) This suggests the Legislature
considered the issue and did not find it necessary to impose
a duty to obtain informed consent on the hospital in the same
way as it did for physicians and surgeons.
Other states have addressed the issue. The almost universal
consensus has been that, where an independent, nonemployee
physician or surgeon performs a surgery utilizing the
hospitals facilities, it is the duty of the physician or surgeon
alone to obtain the patient's informed consent and no such
duty rests with the hospital. (See, e.g., Krane v. Saint Anthony
Hosp. Systems (Colo.App.1987) 738 P.2d 75; Petriello v.
Kalman (D.Conn.1990) 576 A.2d 474; Auler v. Van Natta
(Ind.App.1997) 686 N.E.2d 172; Giese v. Stice (Neb.1997)
567 N.W.2d 156; Fiorentino v. Wenger (N.Y.App.1967) 227
N.E.2d 296; Kershaw v. Reichert (N.D .1989) 445 N.W.2d
16; Goss v. Oklahoma Blood Institute (Okl.App.1990) 856
P.2d 998; Boney v. Mother Frances Hosp. (Tex.App.Tyler 1994) 880 S.W.2d 140.) These other jurisdictions
have recognized that imposing such a duty, as urged by
appellant would detrimentally interfere with the physicianpatient relationship.
We decline to impose on the hospital a duty to obtain
an additional informed consent from the patient as to
surgery performed by a nonemployee physician or surgeon

utilizing the hospital's facilities. In this case, Dr. Johnson
prescribed the hysterectomy as an independent physician and
then utilized his staff privileges to perform the surgery at
the hospital. Dr. Johnson had a duty to obtain appellant's
informed consent, but Cedars had no such duty. Cedars was
entitled to summary adjudication as to the cause of action
for failure to obtain appellant's informed consent to the
hysterectomy.
VIII. Summary Judgment in Favor of Dr. Lineback
*I0 While Cedars's motion for summary judgment was
pending, appellant learned that Dr. Lineback had assisted in
her surgery and added her in an amendment to her complaint.
Thus Dr. Lineback was not a named party in the motion for
summary judgment. Nevertheless, the court granted summary
judgment with respect to both respondents.
Appellant contends that this constituted procedural error.
Assuming, arguendo, there was procedural error, this alone
does not warrant a reversal. Pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 475, no judgment should be reversed due
to error unless it appears from the record that the error was
prejudicial and that a different result would have been likely
if the error had not occurred.
Here, it is readily apparent that a different outcome would
not have resulted even if Dr. Lineback had filed her own
separate motion for summary judgment. Indeed a summary
of the procedural circumstances indicates why Dr. Lineback
came to be in the unusual situation of joining a codefendant's
pending motion.
Appellant filed her complaint against Cedars on August 6,
2004. In January 2005, she filed her first amended complaint.
Dr. Lineback was not named as a defendant in either pleading.
In April 2005, Cedars moved for summary judgment, and
a hearing was scheduled for June 24, 2005. While Cedars's
motion for summary judgment was pending, Dr. Lineback
was added on June 15, 2005, as a Doe defendant. Shortly
thereafter, on July 29, 2005, appellant filed her original
opposition to Cedars's motion for summary judgment. Then,
at appellant's request, the motion was continued multiple
times to allow her time to submit an amended opposition with
a supporting expert declaration. Her amended opposition was
filed on October 26, 2005.
Cedars and Dr. Lineback filed a reply brief. This appears
to be the first time that Dr. Lineback was mentioned as
a moving party in connection with Cedars's motion for
summary judgment. At the hearing on November 9, 2005,
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Cedars's counsel stated: "Since filing of the motion for
summary judgment, [appellant] amended the complaint to
add Dr. Lineback, who's a resident at Cedars whose only role
was assisting in the surgery. [%] The motion for summary
judgment addressed that the surgery complied with the
standard of care.... Does this motion apply to her"? The trial
court concluded that it did, and ordered Cedars's counsel
to prepare an order reflecting its ruling that it was granting
summary judgment to Cedars and Dr. Lineback.
Thus, the trial court treated the reply brief as if it were a proper
vehicle for Dr. Lineback to formally join Cedars's summary
judgment motion. Dr. Lineback's "motion" for summary
judgment does not comply with the statutory requirements.
Dr. Lineback did not file any appropriate moving papers,
such as a separate statement. (Code Civ. Proa, § 437c, subd.
(b); Village Nurseries v. Greenbaum (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th
26, 46-47.) Given that she was first mentioned as a "moving
party" in the reply brief, she also did not provide adequate
statutory notice that she intended to "join" in Cedars's motion.
(See, e.g., Urshan v. Musicians' Credit Union (2004) 120
Cal.App.4th 758, 765.) The issue then is whether these
failures constitute reversible error.
* / / We conclude that the order granting summary judgment
to Dr. Lineback should be affirmed. A judgment may be set
aside if, after an examination of the whole record, the court
is convinced that an error has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice, was prejudicial, and that a different result would be
probable if no error had occurred. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13;
Code Civ. Proa, § 475; Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33
Cal.4th 780, 802.) Appellant cannot establish these elements.
Other than claiming that her right to notice was violated,
she demonstrates no prejudice. She offers no argument or
evidence that would compel denial of Dr. Lineback's motion
for summary judgment.
In the same vein, appellant does not demonstrate that a
different result would have been probable had the error not

occurred. As we noted above, appellant's claims against Dr.
Lineback are limited by her pleadings, which limit her claims
to medical malpractice in the performance of the surgery and
in the failure to obtain informed consent. As set forth in the
trial court's order granting the motion for summary judgment,
there is no evidence that Cedars or its physicians did anything
wrong. It follows that appellant has no claim against Dr.
Lineback, who merely assisted in the procedure.
In fact, collateral estoppel would bar appellant's claims. "The
doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an
issue previously adjudicated if: (1) the issue necessarily
decided in the previous suit is identical to the issue sought
to be relitigated; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits
of the previous suit; and (3) the party against whom the plea
is asserted was a party, or in privity with a party, to the
previous suit." {Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins.
Co. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 903, 910.) Summary judgment in favor
of Cedars is a final judgment on the merits establishing that
the standard of care was met at all times during appellant's
surgery, without regard to the specific acts of Dr. Johnson or
Dr. Lineback. Thus, appellant is collaterally estopped from
relitigating this issue, and Dr. Lineback would prevail as a
matter of law on any claim for medical malpractice relating
to the hysterectomy.
Moreover, Dr. Lineback had no duty to obtain appellant's
informed consent because she was merely a resident assisting
in the surgery.
It follows that the procedural errors committed in connection
with the trial court's order granting summary judgment to Dr.
Lineback do not amount to reversible error.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

We concur: DOI TODD and ASHMANN-GERST, JJ.

Footnotes
1
Elam v. College Park Hospital (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 332, •einafter, Elam.
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